

- 24 'International Relations and the Concept of the Political', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 307.
- 25 *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*.
- 26 *Inside/Outside*, p. 20.
- 27 In a recent and perceptive essay on Walker, Lene Hansen suggests that the three key either/ors are inside/outside, self/other and universality/particularity. My own view would be that time/space plays more of a role than self/other – this latter is central, by contrast to the work of David Campbell. See Lene Hansen, R.B.J. Walker: deconstructing IR', in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making* (London: Routledge, 1997).
- 28 Though he is also clear that he is, obviously, more sympathetically disposed towards the latter than the former.
- 29 James Der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy*, p. 3.
- 30 Der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy*, p. 3.
- 31 Der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy*, p. 3.
- 32 Der Derian, *Anti-Diplomacy*, p. 7.
- 33 Krasser, 'The Achievements of IPE', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds), *International Theory: Postivism and Beyond*, p. 124. Discussed in Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, p. 7.
- 34 Her book *Women and War* (Brighton: Harvester, 1987) has been an enormously influential treatment of issues of war and peace from a feminist perspective. At the same time, in her recent *Democracy on Trial* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), she is very critical of many aspects of contemporary feminist thought and practice.
- 35 Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). The quotation is from *Women and War*, p. 89.
- 36 Elshtain, 'Women and War: Ten years on', *Review of International Studies*, 1998, 24(4): 447–60. See especially p. 449, where she remarks 'I consider myself a realist but I am not a scientized realist of the sort that now dominates in the academy, at least in the United States'.
- 37 Jean Bethke Elshtain, *New Wine and Old Bottles: Ethical Discourse and International Politics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), sec p. 4.
- 38 Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Real Politics in Everyday Life*.
- 39 Elshtain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics*, p. 91.
- 40 See Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Meditations on Modern Political Thought: Masculine/Feminine Themes From Luther to Arendt* (Pittsburgh, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1992 [1986]), p. 107.
- 41 See Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
- 42 Elshtain, *Meditations on Modern Political Thought*, p. 111.
- 43 Elshtain, *New Wine and Old Bottles*, p. 5.
- 44 An indication of the closeness of their relationship is that when her second husband died, Morgenthau proposed to her. An even stronger indication is that her gentle refusal left their friendship largely untouched. A good discussion of their relationship can be found in Elizabeth Young-Breuhl's excellent biography of Arendt, *For Love of the World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978). The work of a PhD student of mine, Mitchell Rologas, has also begun to uncover strong echoes of their mutual influence.
- 45 For Beth's own sense of his 'relativism' see the recent biography by Michael Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998).

Epilogue

Ordering ends?

I have not troubled myself about the great wars ... I am not altogether on anybody's side, because nobody is altogether on my side.

Fangorn, in J. R. R. Tolkien, *The Lord of the Rings*

A book like this cannot really be concluded. All of the responses, theories and interpretations discussed herein are living options strongly argued for (and against) in the academy and outside and all will continue to play their parts in the attempt to understand 'how it all hangs together', as John Ruggie (quoting Edward Teller) has it.¹ However, just as Michael Dummett once remarked that authors owe their readers a preface,² I think they owe them some sort of conclusion as well. Thus, I offer this epilogue to the book as a whole as a substitute for the 'conclusion' I do not think can be written.

It has three parts. In the first, I want to offer a brief sketch of where I think 'we are now', in IR theory. Then, second, I want to consider briefly one particular trajectory embryonic in contemporary international studies, but growing rapidly – as indeed it is, more or less, in most social sciences – and suggest what at least some of the implications of this might be. Third and lastly, I want to outline, in the briefest possible manner, how the 'problem of order' might be reconceptualized in the light of a rather different 'disposition of thought' to those discussed herein and frame some of the implications of this reconceptualization.

From IR theory to international political theory

So where are we now? To begin, as I did in the Introduction, with the obvious: IR theory is now *irretrievably* plural. Of course, some scholars have suggested that serious plurality has characterized international studies at least since the early 1980s. Kai Holsti, after all, famously wrote about the 'dividing discipline' at that time.³ However, the plurality I have discussed here cuts more deeply still, consisting, as we have seen, of both methodological (indeed deeply 'philosophical') as well as 'substantive' or 'normative' differences. Moreover, 'International Relations' as an academic study is now far too broad and diverse, spread way beyond its original heartlands of Britain and the United States (however much

the latter is still dominant), for this to cease; indeed, as more cultures and more viewpoints become part and parcel of the debate in international studies, it is likely to increase greatly.

This is one of the reasons why I think that attempts, both intellectual and institutional, to stifle debate or at least to direct it and channel it into 'appropriate' methodological or normative forms are pointless. Those who seek to implement such practices will simply come to resemble an increasingly ineffective and ridiculous Canute, seeking to hold back the waters of methodological and normative diversity as they lap around their necks! Surely it would be better to seek to engage rival or alternative accounts (as, to be fair, some have certainly started to do) as at least genuine 'others', worthy of respect and critical attention.

In a rather different context, as I have already remarked, the philosopher James Sterba has discussed the advantages he sees in replacing what he characterizes as a 'warmaking way of doing philosophy' – where arguments are 'attacked' and sunk (like a ship) or shot down (like a plane) – with what he calls a *pacemaking* way, where real attempts to produce agreement, change minds or, anyway, seriously consider alternative or rival views are placed at the centre of debate.⁴ I suggest this applies not just to philosophy but to the academic project as a whole.

If this plurality is, as I have suggested, now a permanent feature of International Studies in the academy – reflecting, of course, the increasingly hybrid (though also interconnected) multicultural, multilateral character of the world it studies – then surely we should relax some of the hard and fast assumptions that have come to play so large a role in the contemporary academy. But in this case, then, what counts as international studies must surely increase dramatically and the methodological and theoretical eclecticism will of course increase with it.

As far as theoretical reflection upon this diversity is concerned it is worthwhile pointing out that to reflect upon politics in this context will inevitably mean drawing upon the tradition of thought in the West usually termed political theory (and on analogous traditions elsewhere) as well as on much that at least traditionally political theorists do not reflect upon. In this context, then, we will be witnessing the transition from an 'International Relations Theory' where the traditional concerns of political theory are largely excluded to an 'International Political Theory' where such concerns are commonplace *but* where the more traditional concerns of 'IR theory' are not excluded but are part and parcel of the range of enquiries as well as where a growing range of new issues will be important.

In the context of the accounts of international relations that I have discussed in this book this has some fairly obvious implications. Let me start by referring back to that debate between 'rationalism' and 'reflectivism' we visited briefly in the Introduction. Manifestly, Keohane hit on an important aspect to contemporary debates in 'IR theory', and as we have seen, many contemporary writers and theorists have at least half an eye on that debate. However, the main 'debate' in the US-based literature has been, of course, within 'rationalism'. Yet the differences between the 'rationalists' are growing smaller all the time. What

Ole Wæver has referred to as the 'neo-neo' debate – the debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism – has rapidly shrunk to the status of a parish pump debate. As Ruggie has put it,

neo-realism and neoliberal institutionalism have been able to converge to the extent that they have because they now share very similar analytical foundations ... [the debate's] tenor is barely a faint echo of the titanic intellectual and moral struggles between realism and liberalism down the centuries.⁵

Without denying the differences that still exist between neo-realists and neo-liberals it seems to me that this growing rapprochement is not only a fact, but also likely to become more and more important. This is simply because the general assumptions that underlie the 'rationalist' mode of argument seem to me at least to be weighted heavily in favour of neo-liberalism, not least the effective adoption within neo-realism of a methodological individualism that is predicated on a model of *homo economicus* which is in its turn highly sympathetic to (indeed on some readings dependent upon) certain readings of liberalism.

The likely result of this is a 'rationalist' mainstream (in self-conscious 'IR theory') which is progressively more and more 'neo-liberal' in general orientation, though doubtless still with some neo-realist hold-outs. Even neo-realists, however – as we saw in Chapter 1 – are increasingly moderating or subsuming old-style Waltzian neo-realism and replacing it – or supplementing it, if replacing sounds too heterodox – with a much more nuanced and complex 'neo-realism' that looks increasingly like, well, neo-liberalism! The implications of this are simple. The only alternative path which would retain a *distinctive* realist world view would be a return of realism to its roots as an essentially normative theory or at least one that is much closer to aspects of constructivist thought than either neo-realism or neo-liberalism could be. In other words, the future of realism seems to lie precisely in the evolution of an 'international political theory' that is both normative and explanatory and that can therefore allow newer and more nuanced versions of traditional realist ideas (necessity versus ethics, the balance of power etc.) to flourish.

On the 'reflectivist' side of the debate, as we have seen, the hurried promotion of 'constructivism' as the 'acceptable face' of critical theory conceals far more than it illuminates. Constructivist accounts themselves are, in any case, hardly all of a piece. My own view is that one of the most interesting sites of major debate over the next few years will be *within* the constructivist camp as those who want to make over 'constructivist' themes to tie into more mainstream debates are challenged by those constructivists who see their agenda as one which links ever more closely with the growing and broadening agenda of critical theories in international studies.

Yet these latter accounts themselves are likely to be the site of some major debates. For all that Linklater has tried herotically to keep the initial partners in the critical project together, I suspect that the wheels are going to come off the

chariot with a vengeance in the next few years. Debates over the extent to which it is possible to realize the sorts of projects that Linklater and Held – for example – have developed (post-Westphalian citizenship, cosmopolitan democracy) are already showing the considerable differences between the views of a Walker and those of a Linklater. While their critiques of mainstream IR theory are not dissimilar, Linklater's broadly Habermasian account of society and politics seems to me, substantively speaking, to have more in common with certain radical liberal projects than with those of Walker or Der Derian, for all the mutual respect there is between them and for all that Linklater certainly wants to keep all the critical players on the same team. At the same time, both critical theory and post-structurally informed theory in international studies have already been the target of critical sallies by some feminist theorists for allegedly ignoring or downplaying the significance of gender.

However, whilst these differences are real and important enough, there are also other powerful forces working to increase these pluralities. One of the most powerful of these has surfaced several times in the previous chapters, namely the dichotomy between the universal and particular. This is likely to become more and more central, though not really as a question of universal or particular (though to be sure many express it like that) but how one *combines* universality and particularity and which, so to speak, is in the driving seat.

This is brought out most clearly in the 'critical' literatures – or we might say those literatures happiest with the notion of 'international political theory' – which is one reason, in addition to their own intrinsic merits, for their exponential growth and growing influence. It is those associated with these bodies of thought that have done most work thinking through this dichotomy, though they link hands here with realists like Morgenthau and chastened liberals like Aron, Hoffmann and Shklar. The character of the debate within and between them is consequently especially powerfully shaped by this dichotomy. And it is not accidental, of course, that it is in the process of working through this dichotomy that some of the most pressing concerns about 'order' are raised. Moreover, in this problem especially, the methodological and substantive debates I reflected on in the Introduction become fused in interestingly ironic ways. Those *discoursi* which seek to stay within the frame of 'modern' politics – with an inside and an outside – as realism does, and indeed as at least rationally-minded versions of liberalism seem to do as well – will inevitably come down on the side of particularism in substance, though they very often are wedded to (differing) versions of universalism in method. Those versions which challenge modern conceptions of politics, as to varying degrees most of the critical literatures do, tend to be universalistic in substance, but rather more pluralist in methodological terms, though post-structuralism is obviously something of an exception here. Indeed, in an irony that some on both sides will appreciate, on the problem of order at least, the post-structuralists end up in some ways closest to those realists who were always sensitive to the complexity, fluidity and fragility of the 'balance' on which, for them, order had to rest.⁶

As we saw in Chapter 4, this is why critical theory 'proper', as it were, is the

most consistent – though that does not necessarily mean the most correct approach; for it displays a thoroughgoing universalism 'all the way down' (normatively, substantively and methodologically), one which, moreover, is giving enormous thought to the question of how such universality can be combined with the obvious diversity of human life. The success of critical theory in general, as I suggested, will therefore depend upon it being able to balance this successfully and, of course, in a world of globalization this will require that it is a theory of 'international relations' – indeed of world politics – whatever else it also is.

This issue is, however, by no means unique to 'International Relations'. It is worth remembering the increasing disciplinary interpenetration among the social sciences as a whole – with the partial and always problematic exception of economics – and to remember also how central the question of universal and particular is for the social sciences generally. It is now not uncommon to find books on IR theory that contain essays by literary critics, anthropologists, geographers and philosophers, but the newness of this can be overdone: though these disciplines may be new, the fact of interpenetration is not; it was always the case that IR theory had close relations with history, law and even theology. *Diplomatic Investigations*, let us remember – published deep in the mists of antiquity, 1966 – contained essays by historians, theologians and diplomats as well as scholars of international relations and, as Dunne's history of the English school makes clear, the British Committee was always such a hybrid affair.⁷ However, the newer interpenetration is having the obviously beneficial effect that methodological debates within IR theory are part and parcel of more general debates elsewhere, though obviously they will have their own particular ramifications and distinctions. This is likely to grow, it seems to me, and it will surely be all to the good that it does. As it does, though the subject matter of 'International Relations' will remain distinct as a field of learning – and whether it is still called 'International Relations' or by some other name (world politics?) – the general questions relevant to its orientation will be part of the wider questions in the human sciences. Which is surely as it should be. And, as an added bonus (from my point of view at least) it is in the context of these debates in all their plurality that 'international political theory' will find itself most at home as one of the most significant ways that political theorists can ply their trade in late modernity.⁸

International political theory and naturalistic social science

There is, however, one particular development which could easily revolutionize this growing plurality by offering very specific solutions *both* to the question of universal and particular *and* the problem of order. This is the growing recognition among many social scientists that they ignore the literature and arguments of what are now generally referred to as the 'life sciences' at their peril,⁹ and the consequent growth of what we might call an ever more obviously 'naturalistic' social science.