

CHAPTER 13

Toward an Ontology for Global Governance

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In an era marked by shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, weakened states, and proliferating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at local, provincial, national, transnational, international, and global levels of community, the time has come to confront the insufficiency of our ways of thinking, talking, and writing about government. And this imperative is all the greater because the dynamics of change, the shrinking of social, economic, and political distances, and the focus on the inherent weaknesses of the United Nations on the occasion of its fiftieth birthday—to mention only the more conspicuous sources—have led to a surge of concern for a still amorphous entity called “global governance.” Welcome as this new focus is, however, it suffers from a reliance on artifacts of the very past beyond which it seeks to move. While myriad books, journals, and study commissions have debated what such an entity involves and whether there are any prospects for its realization, such inquiries are plagued by a lack of conceptual tools appropriate to the task of sorting out the underpinnings of political processes sustained by altered borders, redirected legitimacy sentiments, impaired or paralyzed governments, and new identities.¹

A depleted toolbox suggests that understanding is no longer served by clinging to the notion that states and national governments are the essential underpinnings of the world's organization. We have become so accustomed to treating these entities as the foundations of politics that

we fall back on them when contemplating the prospects for governance on a global scale, thereby relegating the shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, and proliferating NGOs to the status of new but secondary dimensions of the processes through which communities allocate values and frame policies. To be sure, these dimensions are regarded as important, and few observers would dismiss their impact as peripheral. Nonetheless, the predominant tendency is to cling to old ways of thought that accord primacy to states and national governments. Even an otherwise praiseworthy attempt to clarify and define the nature of global governance proved unable to break free of the conventional conception which posits states and governments as the organizing focus of analysis: while acknowledging the enormous changes at work in the world, the transformation of boundaries, the erosion of state authority, and the proliferation of NGOs, in the end this definitional undertaking falls back on old ways of thought and specifies that global governance involves "doing internationally what governments do at home."² Such a formulation amply demonstrates the large extent to which we remain imprisoned by the idea that the line dividing domestic and foreign affairs still serves as the cutting edge of analysis.

How, then, to update our perspectives so that they can more fully and accurately account for a world in which the dynamics of governance are undergoing profound and enduring transformations? How to render political inquiry more incisive, more able to treat seemingly anomalous developments as part and parcel of modern-day governance? How to equip ourselves so that we are not surprised by a Soviet Union that peacefully collapses overnight, by a Canada that borders on fragmentation, by a Yugoslavia that seeks membership in the European Union even as it comes apart, by a currency crisis that surfaces simultaneously around the world, by a South Africa that manages to bridge a long standing and huge racial divide, by the splintering of a long-united Israel, or by international institutions that intrude deeply into the domestic affairs of states (to mention only a few of the surprising developments of recent years)?

The answers to these questions lie, I believe, in the need to develop a new ontology for understanding the deepest foundations of governance. Such an ontology—and the paradigms that flow from it—should recast the relevance of territoriality, treat the temporal dimensions of governance as no less significant than the spatial dimensions, posit as normal shifts of authority to subnational, transnational, and nongovernmental levels, and highlight the porosity of boundaries at all levels

of governance. Awesome as this task surely is, what follows offers some initial thoughts on what the outlines of a new ontology should encompass. The goal is not to specify in detail the key ontological premises (the details can be developed only as the ontology is used in empirical inquiries); rather it is to briefly indicate the substantive shifts that people are likely to undergo as they think about the purposes, processes, structures, and loci of governance. By focusing on these prospective shifts, hopefully we can accelerate the pace at which they unfold.

ONTOLOGIES AND PARADIGMS

Let us start by drawing some conceptual distinctions. The concept of an 'ontology' originates in the field of philosophy. It refers to the broad assumptions that people make about the nature of reality. Here the concept is adapted to the field of world politics and is conceived to involve the broad assumptions people make about the realities of global affairs. A 'paradigm,' on the other hand, is conceived here as an empirical specification of what follows from the assumptions encompassed by an ontology. Stated differently, ontologies are foundational in that they highlight what basic elements are regarded as comprising the existing order, whereas paradigms are seen as referring to the ways in which the elements are interactively organized and order is thus imposed upon them. Put in still another way, ontologies are static in that they identify the essential components of the whole they comprise, but paradigms allow for movement on the part of the components and thus focus on the changes as well as the stabilities that comprise the whole. It follows that while one's ontology identifies what actors engage in what forms of behavior to sustain a particular form of global governance, one's paradigm focuses on how and when the actors are likely to maintain or vary their behavior.³ Viewed from the more encompassing perspective in which people perceive and talk about reality, of course, ontologies and paradigms cannot be clearly delineated from each other. We separate them only for analytical purposes (together they constitute what is often referred to as the "social construction of reality").

The need for ontologies and paradigms derives from the fact that people can never grasp reality in its entirety and are thus forced to select some features of the ongoing scene as important and dismiss the rest as trivial. So as to achieve a modicum of order out of the welter of phenomena they select as important, people need to link the various phenomena to each other coherently; that is, they need to render the world

orderly so that they can understand and adapt to it. The ways in which the important features are arranged in relation to each other form the bases of the ontologies and paradigms through which the course of events is interpreted and order imposed upon them. The end result for either individuals or collectivities is an intersubjective—and not an objective—understanding. As Cox puts it, "Reality is made by the collective responses of people to the conditions of their existence. Intersubjectively shared experience reproduces reality in the form of continuing institutions and practices."⁴ In short, "Ontologies tell us what is significant in the particular world we delve into—what are the basic entities and key relationships. Ontologies are not arbitrary constructions; they are the specification of the common sense of an epoch."⁵

This is not to imply that either ontologies or paradigms are necessarily complex and pervaded with multiple layers. On the contrary, normally only a few features, such as the identity of major actors and the essential attributes of their activities, are selected out as crucial structures of governance that serve to explain how and why politics move in one direction rather than another. The prevailing ontology prior to World War II, for example, focused on the balance of power as the common sense of that epoch; in the subsequent period the Cold War with its superpower rivalry served to organize thinking about the world; today neither of these perspectives pertains to the order that has emerged since the beginning of the 1990s. In other words, ontologies are so thoroughgoing and paradigms so all-encompassing in their empirical scope, so capable of accounting for all the developments that are perceived to be relevant to the maintenance or alteration of the political world, that people can summarize their understanding of complex phenomena by reference to a few organizing principles. They do not need to go back and forth between paradigms with the rationale that it all depends on the issue. For ontologies and paradigms are cast at a level of understanding where the sources of behavior in world affairs are presumed to derive from roots more fundamental than those associated with issue differences.

How, then, do ontologies and paradigms, those specifications of the common sense of an epoch, undergo change? In two ways: either the conditions of peoples' existence are so profoundly transformed that people are led by the cumulation and normalization of anomalies to alter the way they intersubjectively experience them, or their awareness of their existing conditions shifts in response to new technologies that enable them to perceive their prevailing circumstances in a new context.

In the present era, both sources of ontological transformation seem likely to operate and reinforce each other. The globalization of national economies, the emergence of a worldwide consumerist culture, the advent of global norms pertaining to human rights and the environment, the challenges of AIDS, the fragmentation of some societies and the integration of others, the drug trade, international crime syndicates, currency crises, and the ozone gap are only the more obvious changes that have become central features of people's condition today. At the same time, the continuing spread of global television and many other features of the unending microelectronic revolution have greatly facilitated an intensified awareness of these new conditions with which they must cope.

However the altered conditions and the awareness of them may combine to foster new intersubjective experiences, a more appropriate ontology and its concomitant paradigms will be slow to evolve and difficult to frame. As previously implied, ontologies are so deep-seated and so rooted as the bases of analytic habits, that they do not readily yield to evidence of obsolescence. The concept of regimes is a good case in point. Conceived originally as an issue area in which the relevant actors share the rules, norms, principles, and procedures through which decisions are made and implemented, the preponderance of the literature that has since mushroomed lays emphasis upon states as comprising the members of regimes.⁶ Little attention is paid to those other than governmental actors despite considerable evidence that in many regimes—such as oil—firms, NGOs, and other types of actors play crucial roles. If it is the case that regimes are a major institutional form through which global governance is carried forward, then it is virtually impossible to assess their contribution to governing processes if their ranks are conceived to consist exclusively of national governments. Nonetheless, analysts using the regime approach have yet to update their inquiries by allowing for NGOs and other types of actors to play major roles in the conduct of regimes.⁷

Stated more generally, faced with the case for an ontological shift, many people may acknowledge that changes are occurring in the territorial, temporal, and organizational underpinnings of governance, but in the same breath they are likely to insist that states and national governments nevertheless continue to retain the primary authority and power they have possessed for several centuries.⁸ Yes, they would agree, the Cold War is over, but it is still an anarchical world of states where national governments and their power balances predominate. Understandable as it may be

to presume that history has resumed from where it left off in 1939, such a reaction can only perpetuate and heighten the limits of our grasp of governance in a turbulent and transformative age. At the same time, the necessity of an ontological shift may seem less ominous and more palatable if it is appreciated that the ensuing formulation does not dismiss states and governments as secondary and peripheral; rather it posits them as central to and consequential for the course of events along with a host of other actors. In other words, a fine line needs to be drawn between treating states as the only players on the global stage and as unimportant and aged players that have long since passed their prime. Given the necessity of not devoting exclusive attention to states and acknowledging that a wide range of nongovernmental actors increasingly need to serve as foci of intensive analysis, it follows that states and governments should be posited not as first among equals, but simply as significant actors in a world marked by an increasing diffusion of authority and a corresponding diminution of hierarchy. Yes, states retain their sovereign rights, but the realms within which these rights can be exercised has diminished as the world becomes ever more interdependent and as state boundaries become ever more porous. With the increasing diffusion of authority, states can no longer rely on their sovereignty as a basis for protecting their interests in the face of increasingly complex challenges.

As will immediately be seen, new ontologies require new labels to clearly differentiate the common sense of the new epoch from its predecessor and to facilitate the development of a widespread intersubjectivity as to the ways in which it breaks with the past. It must be stressed, however, that the label used here is offered tentatively, that it may prove too technical to generate broad usage, and that in all probability a less complex and more compelling terminology will evolve. Indeed, the label used here is not the first to be suggested; among others, for example, are *polyarchy*,⁹ *panarchy*,¹⁰ and *collibration*,¹¹ all three of which highlight the degree to which the world has undergone decentralization since the end of the Cold War. Whatever labels may eventually be adopted, in other words, they are likely to point incisively to the key arrangements that distinguish the epoch from its predecessors. It is not sufficient to designate the new epoch by the label of *post-Cold War*, since this is a term that conveys no image of what the core dynamics of the new epoch involve. The Cold War label, like the "balance of power" epoch that preceded it, did point to substantive phenomena. It was a label that served to summarize the superpower rivalry and the

structures thereby imposed on the rest of the world, whereas to speak now of the post-Cold War period is merely to highlight that the earlier period has ended. Awkward as the label used here may seem, it does capture the essential dynamic wherein the new epoch is marked by the simultaneity of continual tensions and interactions between the forces propelling the fragmentation of communities and those conducting to the integration of communities.

GLOBALIZATION, LOCALIZATION, AND FRAGMENTATION

It seems clear that powerful tendencies toward globalization not only underlie the shifting of boundaries, the relocation of authorities, the weakening of states, and the proliferation of NGOs, but they also provoke equally powerful tendencies toward localization that give rise to further consequences of this sort. If the interactions of sovereign states in an anarchical world lie at the heart of the old ontology, at the center of the new one are the interactions of globalizing and localizing forces, of tendencies toward integration and fragmentation that are so simultaneous and interactive as to collapse into an erratic but singular process to which I have attached the label of *fragmentation*.¹² Grating as this term may be, it has the virtue of capturing the inextricably close and causal links between globalization and localization, highlighting the possibility that each and every increment of the former gives rise to an increment of the latter, and vice versa.

It follows that we live in and study a fragmentive world that cascades events through, over, and around the long-established boundaries of states and, in so doing, relocates authority upwards to transnational and supranational organizations, sideways to social movements and NGOs, and downwards to subnational groups. It is a world in which the logic of governance does not necessarily follow hierarchical lines, in which what is distant is also proximate, and in which the spatial and temporal dimensions of politics are so confounded by fragmentive dynamics as to rid event sequences of any linearity they once may have had. Today's chains of causation follow crazy-quilt patterns that cannot be adequately discerned if one clings to an ontology that presumes the primacy of states and governments.

At the very least, a more appropriate ontology will highlight the large extent to which the erosion of state authority and the proliferation of NGOs has resulted in a disaggregation of the loci of governance. Notwithstanding the overriding power of globalizing forces in the economic,

communications, and cultural realms, and despite the signs of expanding integration to be found in Europe and other regions today, fragmentation has been accompanied by a dispersion of the sites out of which authority can be exercised and compliance generated. The weakening of states has not been followed by authority vacuums (although there may be situations where this is the case) so much as it has resulted in a vast growth in the number of spheres into which authority has moved. Fragmentation points to a redistribution of authority and not to its deterioration.

In short, if a map of the world based on the new ontology were drawn, it would depict global governance as highly disaggregated even as many of its spheres are overlapping. Global governance is not so much a label for a high degree of integration and order as it is a summary term for highly complex and widely disparate activities that may culminate in a modicum of worldwide coherence or that may collapse into pervasive disarray.¹³ In the event of either outcome, it would still be global governance in the sense that the sum of efforts by widely disaggregated goal-seeking entities will have supplemented, perhaps even supplanted, states as the prime sources of governance on a global scale. And whichever outcome eventually predominates, both will surely be sufficiently cumbersome to prevent either from amounting to an effective arrangement for addressing the need for decisive and equitable policies that ameliorate the large problems comprising the global agenda.

Of course, the present era is not the only moment in history when disaggregation has marked the loci of governance. In earlier eras, for example, considerable authority was exercised by members of the Hanseatic League and the Medici and Rothschild families. Indeed, one can doubtless find numerous historical circumstances that parallel any examples that appear as central to the dynamics of boundary erosion and change today. Just as AIDS moves quickly through national boundaries today, so did the Plague in the Sixteenth Century; just as the Internet, fax machine, and global television render boundaries ever more porous today, so did the advent of the printing press, the wireless, and the telephone spread ideas independently of national borders in earlier eras; and so on for all the channels whereby the processes of globalization and localization are presently expanding and contracting horizons. The difference in the current period is that the processes of aggregation and disaggregation are occurring and interacting so rapidly—more often than not instantaneously—to the point of being literally simulta-

neous. That is, the pace of politics at all levels of community has accelerated to the extent that reactions to events occur roughly at the same time as the events themselves, leaving actors as always in a mode of seeking to catch up with the consequences of decisions to which they were also parties. It is for this reason that the emergent ontology will doubtless include a new understanding of the temporal dimension of politics.

UNITS OF GOVERNANCE

It follows that the new ontology requires us to focus on those political actors, structures, processes, and institutions that initiate, sustain, or respond to globalizing forces as they propel boundary-spanning activities and foster boundary-contracting reactions. Approached in this way, states become only one of many sources of authority, only one of many organizations through which the dynamics of fragmentation shape the course of events. Stated differently, instead of initially positing a world dominated by states and national governments, the new ontology builds on the premise that the world is comprised of spheres of authority (SOAs) that are not necessarily consistent with the division of territorial space and are subject to considerable flux. Such spheres are, in effect, the analytic units of the new ontology. They are distinguished by the presence of actors who can evoke compliance when exercising authority as they engage in the activities that delineate the sphere. Authority, in other words, is conceived not as a possession of actors, nor as embedded in roles. Authority is relational; its existence can only be observed when it is both exercised and complied with. A new occupant of a position may acquire formal authority upon taking up the duties of the position, but whether his or her authority is effective and enduring depends on the response of those toward whom the authority is directed. If they are responsive, then authority can be said to be operative; if they do not respond compliantly, then the formal prerequisites of the position are quite irrelevant.

It follows that SOAs can differ in form and structure, depending on the degree to which their relational foundations are hierarchically arrayed. They can vary from those founded on hierarchical arrangements that explicitly allow for unexplained orders backed up by the capacity to coerce or dismiss those who do not comply (command authority), as is the case in military organizations, to SOAs that involve an implicit capacity to force compliance if persuasion proves insufficient

to achieve it (bureaucratic authority), as is the case when nonmilitary governmental or nongovernmental officials exercise authority, to SOAs in which authority derives from expertise (epistemic authority), as is the case when people comply because specialists concur in a recommendation.¹⁴

It also follows that an SOA may or may not be coterminous with a bounded territory; those who comply may be spread around the world and have no legal relationship to each other, or they may be located in the same geographic space and have the same organizational affiliations. If the sphere involves the allocation of values through certifying and rating the reliability of bond issuers, for example, then its actors will include Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and a number of other credit rating agencies whose evaluations determine which firms, governments, and NGOs in various parts of the world get loans and which do not.¹⁵ In contrast to these nonterritorial SOAs, on the other hand, are those in which the allocation of values remains linked to geographic space, thus enabling local, provincial, and national governments to achieve compliance when they exercise authority over taxes, parklands, police activities, and other domains wherein they have not experienced a shift and contraction of their jurisdictions.

The advent of nonterritorial actors and relocated authorities helps to explain the recent tendency to focus on processes of governance rather than those of governments as the instruments through which authority is exercised. While governments are concrete actors accorded formal jurisdiction over specified territorial domains, governance is a broader concept that highlights SOAs that may not be territorial in scope and that may employ only informal authority to achieve compliance on the part of those within the sphere. *Governance*, in other words, refers to mechanisms for steering social systems toward their goals,¹⁶ a conception which is far more amenable to understanding a world in which old boundaries are becoming obscure, in which new identities are becoming commonplace, and in which the scale of political thought has become global in scope. Indeed, it might well be that the shift to the emphasis on governance will prove to be the first major indicator that a new intersubjective ontology for understanding world affairs is already in the process of taking hold in the awareness of people.

Still another sign of the emergent ontology can be discerned in the variety of new terms that have evolved to designate units of governance which are not instruments of states and governments. At least ten such units have achieved acceptance in (and in some cases pervade) the lit-

erature on world politics: NGOs, nonstate actors, sovereignty-free actors, issue networks, policy networks, social movements, global civil society, transnational coalitions, transnational lobbies, and epistemic communities.¹⁷ While an intersubjective consensus has yet to shake this terminology down into a shared vocabulary, clearly the proliferation of such terms expresses a restlessness with the prevailing ontological preoccupation with states and governments.

HIERARCHY

In a disaggregated, decentralized world in which SOAs are relatively independent of each other, what might the new ontology specify as common sense with respect to the pervasiveness of hierarchy? Again it may be difficult to move on to new ways of thinking. Hierarchy involves power and the relative capability of actors, and we are so accustomed to positing pecking orders in these terms that it will not be easy to come to grips with a disaggregated array of actors whose power is limited to a particular expertise or set of issues, thus rendering them essentially autonomous and not dependent on where they stand in a pecking order. More specifically, the new ontology allows for within-sphere hierarchies, since actors with similar goals in a SOA are likely to have different capabilities that differentiate their degrees of influence, but there is no basis for presuming that a pecking order will develop among SOAs. Some credit rating agencies may be more influential than others, but there is no necessary basis for presuming either that the most high-status credit agency can achieve compliance from actors outside its sphere or that its compliance can be achieved by actors in other spheres. "Wait a minute," those wedded to the old ontology might exclaim, "what about the state's sovereignty? Surely that enables it to curb or override any credit agency operating within its borders!" Not at all, respond those who have adopted the new ontology, authority inheres in a sphere, and if a state or national government succeeds in curbing or overruling the actions of a credit agency, such an outcome will be a consequence of the circumstances of the sphere in which the two actors compete rather than stemming from the state having sovereign authority which the credit agency lacks. Put differently, what enables an actor to obtain compliance from another actor in a disaggregated world is an interdependent convergence of needs and not a constitutional specification that assigns the highest authority exclusively to states and national governments. In addition, the hierarchy that derives from

the military power over which states have a monopoly and through which they exercise their sovereignty in the last resort can no longer, given the disaggregation of SOAs, be translated into leverage over credit agencies.

WHAT ABOUT BOUNDED SYSTEMS?

Given the widening porosity of conventional political boundaries, the shifting loci of authority, and the emergence of a nonterritorial, nonlinearity car politics, the question arises as to whether the foregoing analysis cannot also be applied to the governance of more circumscribed domains? If frangible dynamics are as pervasive and significant as suggested here, are they not also operative within bounded societies? And if so, do they not also exert pressure for a new ontology to replace the one that has long served as the intersubjective basis for understanding domestic politics?

A positive answer to such questions can readily be asserted even if it may yet be premature to undertake specifying an ontology comparable to that organized around the notion of frangibility. Certainly frangible dynamics are no less relevant to societal systems than they are to the global system. Surely it is reasonable to think in terms of SOAs as units of governance within societies as it is between them. Doubtless the exercise of authority in societal processes is as likely as in global ones to cascade across space and time in an erratic fashion, flowing first in one direction, then in another, followed by still a third redirection, even a reversal to the point of origin, with the result that compliance cumulates, gets modified, or is terminated in nonlinear sequences. And given societies that are as disaggregated as the global system they comprise, they will in all likelihood increasingly be marked by an eroding between-SOA pecking order.

Indeed, given a conviction that "the governing capacity of political/administrative systems . . . either has crossed the threshold of the law of diminishing returns or is quite close to such a boundary,"¹⁸ with the result that "political governance in modern societies can no longer be conceived in terms of external governmental control of society but emerges from a plurality of governing actors,"¹⁹ signs of efforts to specify a new common sense of societal governance in the emergent epoch are already manifest. An entire symposium, for example, has been devoted to probing "new patterns of interaction between government and society" and thereby to "discovering other ways of coping with new prob-

lems or of creating new possibilities for governing."²⁰ It seems clear, in short, that this paper is part and parcel of a larger thrust to update our commonsense understanding of politics in a turbulent world.

NOTES

1. See, for example, a new journal, *Global Governance*, published by Lynne Rienner Publishers in cooperation with the Academic Council on the United Nations [ACUNS] and the United Nations University. The books and study commission reports on the subject include The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); The Commission on Global Governance, *Issues in Global Governance: Paper Written for The Commission on Global Governance* (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995); Meghnad Desai and Paul Redfern, eds., *Global Governance: Ethics and Economics of the World Order* (London: Pinter, 1995); Jan Kooiman, ed., *Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions* (London: Sage Publications, 1993); Mihaly Simai, *The Future of Global Governance: Managing Risk and Change in the International System* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994); and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System* (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 1994).

2. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "What Is Global Governance?" *Global Governance*, vol. 1 (Sept.-Dec. 1995), pp. 367-72 (the quote is from p. 369).

3. This notion of paradigm extends, but does not contradict, the early specification of the concept set forth in Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 2nd edition). For a discussion of twenty-one different ways in which the paradigm concept is employed, see Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 61-65).

4. Robert W. Cox, "Critical Political Economy," in Bjorn Hetteg, ed., *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder* (London: Zed Books, 1995), p. 35.

5. Cox, "Critical Political Economy," p. 34.

6. For examples of how regimes are conceived to consist primarily of national governments, see most of the essays in Stephen D. Kasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), as well as Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 98-106.

7. For an exception in this regard, see Virginia Haufler, "Crossing the Boundary between Public and Private: International Regimes and Non-State

Actors," in Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations*, pp. 94-111.

8. For written expressions of this ambivalent perspective, see Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7; Alan James and Robert H. Jackson, "The Character of Independent Statehood," in A. James and R. H. Jackson, eds., *States in a Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 5-8; Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in James A. Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), chap. 4; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 7; and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94.

9. Seyom Brown, *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics* (New York: HarperCollins, Post-Cold War Edition, 1995), chap. 8.

10. James P. Sewell and Mark B. Salter, "Panarchy and Other Norms for Global Governance," *Global Governance*, vol. 1 (Sept.-Dec. 1995), pp. 373-82.

11. Andrew Dunshire, "Modes of Governance," in J. Kooiman, *Modern Governance*, p. 31.

12. This concept was first developed in James N. Rosenau, "Fragmentative Challenges to National Security," in Terry Heyns, ed., *Understanding US Strategy: A Reader* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1983), pp. 65-82, and has since been considerably elaborated in James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 7.

13. For a cogent discussion of the dynamics driving change in globalizing directions, see Philip G. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action," *International Organization*, vol. 49 (Autumn 1995), pp. 595-625.

14. For a useful discussion of the nature of authority and the forms it can take, see Bruce Lincoln, *Authority: Construction and Corrosion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

15. Timothy J. Sinclair, *Guarding the Gates of Capital: Credit Rating Processes and the Global Political Economy* (Toronto: Ph.D. Dissertation, York University, 1995).

16. James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the 21st Century," *Global Governance*, vol. 1 (Winter 1995), p. 14.

17. I am indebted to Ken Conca for this listing.

18. Jan Kooiman, "Social-Political Governance: Introduction," in J. Kooiman, ed., *Modern Governance*, p. 1.

19. Quoted from the back flap of B. Marin and R. Mayntz, *Policy Networks*, in Jan Kooiman, "Findings, Speculations, and Recommendations," in J. Kooiman, ed., *Modern Governance*, p. 258 (italics in the original).

20. J. Kooiman, "Social-Political Governance: Introduction," p. 1.