reasonable to expect the quality of the candidate to be of greater importance in such elections. Interestingly, we do not find such an effect in our analysis. Thus, while we set out to cast light on a contemporary “puzzle”—the rise of the incumbency advantage—we seem to have only enlarged our puzzle as we now must eventually explain the lack of incumbent success in spite of a considerable incumbency advantage.


Chapter 17

Speaker David Henderson and the Partisan Era of the U.S. House

CHARLES J. FINOCCHIARO AND DAVID W. ROHDE

The Partisan Era of the U.S. House

While the speakership of Thomas B. Reed has garnered much attention over the years, that of his Republican successor, David B. Henderson, has been virtually overlooked. The historical literature on the period, as well as the scant writings focused on Henderson in particular, generally paint a picture of a weak, rather aloof figurehead standing in stark contrast to the largely efficacious leadership of Reed. This state of affairs is peculiar in that Henderson assumed the reins of leadership at a point in time in which centralized, effective leadership would appear to have been more necessary than ever. The Republican majority over the Democrats and a handful of Populists and prosilver third-party candidates had slipped to just 13 seats (Fuller 1909, 248), the smallest majority margin for either party since Reed first assumed the speakership in 1889. Thus, this interlude of the partisan era begs for explanation. Was Henderson the partisan that the general depiction of the era might lead us to believe? If not, then theories of parties in Congress would seem to be missing something in their ability to explain the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies of parties based on changes in coalitional politics. The conditions for strong leadership were ripe, and yet there seems to be little or no evidence of such initiative on the part of Henderson.

The theoretical perspective from which we approach the consideration of David B. Henderson is conditional party government, or CPG (Rohde
This view argues that the strength of party organizations in the House depends in large part on how homogeneous the policy views of members are (particularly in the majority party) and on how divergent the policy positions of the parties are. The idea is that members are more willing to delegate power to leaders when they can expect that the leaders are likely to hold views similar to theirs, and when legislative victories by the opposition would be particularly unsatisfactory. The literature on congressional politics for the Reed-Henderson period shows widespread agreement that the parties were quite homogeneous and sharply divided from one another (Brady and Epstein 1997; Brady and Altoff 1974).

If this consensus picture of the policy views of the two parties is correct, then CPG theory would expect members of the majority party to be particularly willing to delegate power to their leadership and to support the exercise of that power to advance the party's legislative program. In the case of Reed's speakership, events seem to square well with the theory, as does the later period of Joseph G. Cannon's leadership. The Reed rules empowered the Speaker and the rest of the leadership, and Reed (and Cannon) used the procedural advantages vigorously. The speakership of Henderson is, however, more problematic. Thus, to assess fully the accuracy of CPG theory for this period, we must look more closely at Henderson with regard to both the willingness of his party to delegate power and how he exercised power.

The Speakership of David B. Henderson, 1899–1903

David Bremner Henderson was born in Scotland in 1840 to a family who immigrated to the United States when he was 6 years of age, settling initially in Illinois and shortly thereafter in Iowa (Hoing 1957). Henderson's Scottish roots are particularly important in that they disqualified him for the presidency, a point that was noted frequently during his rise to power and eventual assumption of the speakership. Many of his contemporaries harbored executive ambitions, and this fact of Henderson's life set him apart from the likes of Reed and Cannon. Whether it was a factor in his election to the speakership is a matter of some speculation.

Henderson's career in the House before assuming the speakership was one of marked distinction. Unlike his successor, Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, who would "never author a major bill" throughout his service in Congress (Peters 1997, 75), Henderson had been involved in the drafting of significant legislation at various points in his career. He chaired a select committee that the Republican caucus established early in 1899 to put together a banking bill (Gold 1980, 170; Hoing 1957, 13), which was a centerpiece of President McKinley’s agenda at the time. He played a hand in the Railway Safety bill and “fathered the first important bankruptcy bill passed by Congress” (Hoing 1957, 4). Henderson also sat as a member of the Appropriations Committee for a few Congresses and chaired the Committee on the Militia in the 51st Congress. His stock rose to an even greater degree when the Republicans reasserted control of the House in 1895, as he chaired the Judiciary Committee in the 54th and 55th Congresses while simultaneously holding a seat on the prestigious Rules Committee (Canon, Nelson, and Stewart 1998).

Henderson was elected Speaker after Reed's decision not to return for another term in the House. The competition among Republicans for the gavel involved many of the party’s leading figures and contained tones of regional and even intrastate conflict. For example, there were multiple candidates from both Illinois (Albert J. Hopkins challenging Cannon) and New York (James S. Sherman and Sereno E. Payne). Hoing (1957) presents what seems to be the most extensive discussion of the circumstances surrounding the election, in which he argues that the election was clinched in the closing days because of the support of the Wisconsin and Ohio delegations. Critical to Henderson's victory, at least in the eyes of some observers, was his tie to the party establishment and to Reed’s policies. Hopkins, who was threatening to undercut Henderson's support in the middle and Western states, ran prominently on "promises of liberality" and sought to paint Henderson and many of the other more regular Republican candidates as likely to mirror the tactics and practices of Reed in the Speaker's chair. As Hoing (1957, 11) argues, such remarks probably won Hopkins a few friends but must have turned Reed supporters away from him, no doubt helping Henderson, who was fairly close to Reed in some respects.”

A second factor in Henderson's election, according to Schickler (2001), was his support from a number of powerful senators, including fellow Iowan William Boyd Allison and Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island. As Schickler notes, however, the evidence regarding the Senate leadership's role in the election, and its motivations in particular, is "indirect" (302). Further, his conclusion that one of the primary effects of Henderson's tenure as Speaker was to weaken the House vis-à-vis the Senate is, in his own words, "tentative" (303). Our treatment of Henderson will focus not at all on the potentially important relationship between the House and Senate but will grapple with the other fundamental question raised by Schickler and the historical and political science accounts of the era more generally: does the era represent one of strong party government, and how can party theory help in explaining the observed pattern?
HENDERSON AS PARTY LEADER

Interestingly, while Henderson was clearly a member of the party’s mainstream at the time he was tapped to lead the party in the House, by all accounts a party regular with strong loyalties to the GOP, his tenure as Speaker seems to indicate anything but czar rule, which is what we have come to expect and associate with this era of congressional history. Hoing’s 1957 study of Henderson alludes to the possibility that his decision to step down in 1902 was based on a relative weakness when it came to organizational matters. Citing a “Comment” in Harper’s Weekly, Hoing suggests that “others believed Henderson realized that he lacked the strong personality to control the popular branch of Congress, because the Reed rules, necessary to operate the House effectively, demanded a firm hand” (26). In a similar vein, Fuller’s (1909) account maintains that Henderson was a “man of moderate ability and rather weak of will power, . . . dominated at all times by the members of the Committee on Rules, consisting of Payne, [John] Dalzell, and Cannon. Henderson as a Speaker betrayed his weak points” (248).2

Others offer more tempered assessments of Henderson’s leadership. Chiu (1928, 293) posits that he made practically “no advance in the importance of the Speakership.” In the words of Kennon (1986, 194), when contrasted with “the brilliant and often imperious Thomas Brackett Reed, Henderson became known as a popular, though not brilliant, Speaker. Where Reed had ruled the House like a czar, Henderson managed affairs in a straightforward, businesslike manner.” As a final example, in his study of the speakership, Peters evaluates Henderson’s service as “lackluster” (1997, 75).

A general consensus among those looking at the speakership of the purportedly partisan era of the House holds that there was variation in the centrality and power of the office during this time, but others disagree (Bolling 1974; Galloway and Wise 1976; Riddick 1949; Schickler 2001; Hoing 1957; Clark 1920). Interestingly, some sources seem to offer accounts evincing both strength and weakness on the part of Henderson. Yet it is reasonable to say that, at the individual level, many have claimed that Henderson paled in comparison to his Republican counterparts in Reed and Cannon. In the next few sections, we turn to some evidence that bears more directly on this thesis.

A VIEW OF HENDERSON THROUGH THE LENS OF CPG

As we discussed earlier, CPG theory rests on two related factors: intraparty agreement and interparty divergence. As parties become increasingly homogeneous internally and find themselves at odds with the other party on significant policy questions, the likelihood of strong party leadership increases. Thus, power is more likely to be delegated to party leaders, and those leaders are more likely to exercise that power in the interest of broad party goals. Since CPG has been developed and discussed at length elsewhere, our aim here is to employ this perspective during David B. Henderson’s tenure in the Speaker’s chair in ways that will allow for a test of CPG theory in a historical era. The product is a narrative that, we will argue, provides a more complete understanding of this period of House history.

THE DELEGATION OF POWER TO SPEAKER HENDERSON

The theory’s expectations about delegating power to leaders of a homogeneous party do not require that new powers be granted. If the preceding leader had been granted substantial powers, the delegation may consist of simply ratifying the status quo. This appears to be what happened when Henderson took over from Reed. The Republicans had to decide whether to continue with the Reed rules or to move to a less centralized regime. The matter was first addressed in the Republican caucus before Henderson’s ratification as Speaker by the full House. The leadership wanted to confirm the Reed rules, but there was dissent. William Hepburn of Iowa (who would later be a significant figure in the 1909 revolt against Cannon) sought to return to the old method of recognition in which the chair always recognized the first person to rise. He also wanted to make the Rules Committee independent of the leadership. Hepburn put these ideas in the form of an amendment to the proposed rules, but after debate made clear that there was little support for his views, he withdrew the amendment (New York Times, September 3, 1899, p. 2). Two days later, the proposed rules package came before the full House. John Dalzell, one of the Republican floor leaders, proposed the readoption of the rules of the previous Congress. Democrats protested and argued for drafting a different set of rules. Hepburn then rose and said that he, too, had favored modifications but that the Republican caucus had been opposed to him (New York Times, September 5, 1899, p. 5). Thus the members of the majority still favored delegation of strong powers to their leadership, and the minority objected to this, just as the theory would expect. There is no evidence here that the Republicans wanted a less centralized leadership or a figurehead as Speaker.

THE RULES COMMITTEE AND FLOOR AGENDA SETTING UNDER SPEAKER HENDERSON

A central component of majority-party leadership and agenda setting, in both the modern House and in the House as it functioned in the late 1800s...
It is with humiliation unspeakable that I rise in my place on this floor and admit to my constituents at home that in this House I am utterly powerless to bring any bill or measure, no matter how worthy or meritorious it may be, to a vote unless I can first make terms with the Speaker (Congressional Record, April 17, 1902, p. 4320).

Cushman was objecting both to the Republican machine in the House and to the approach by which this particular bill was called up—as a privileged measure relating to the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee, based on its control of legislation affecting revenue. Yet in committee, all revenue-related amendments were ruled out of order on the grounds of nongermaneness. The same issue emerged on the floor, where according to Hoing (1957, 25–26), "An amendment to put hides on the free list was defeated by only sixteen votes. All other attempted amendments to the act were then arbitrarily ruled out of order by Speaker Henderson." Thus, in this instance as well, it appears that the Republican majority was successful in heading off amendments that would likely have been adopted on the floor if consideration had been allowed.

Yet Hoing’s account tells only part of the story. This occasion also witnessed what was probably the most significant insurrection within the ranks of the House majority party during Henderson’s tenure. Led by Majority Whip James Tawney of Minnesota and energized by Cushman’s floor speech denouncing the heavy-handed leadership style of the Speaker, a number of Republicans friendly to the beet sugar industry bolted from the party. They voted to overturn the initial ruling of the chair regarding the nongermaneness of an amendment to repeal the differential tariff on refined sugar and voted with the Democrats in adding the amendment to the bill. While much of the attention given to the issue of reciprocity with Cuba focused at the time on this defection, all subsequent amendments were ruled nongermane, and the Republicans stood with the chair of the Committee of the Whole, despite his repeated rulings going against the prior sense of the House when it overruled him on the germaneness question.

Thus, while the leadership lost once on tariff issues relating to a particular constituency, the party was able to maintain control over the broader issue and maintain the status quo on broader tariff policy when it came to a number of other specific items and even wholesale tariff revision, as had been proposed by Babcock and supported by other members of the Republican caucus. Speaker Henderson’s actions in light of this occasion also tell us something about his leadership. While the insurgents predicted that they would go on to further victories, Henderson seems to have preempted such
action by sending a strong message to the insurgents through his sanctioning of Tawney, who was temporarily removed as party whip (Ripley 1967, 21).

While these accounts paint a picture of Henderson's leadership as it relates to setting the floor agenda on two specific bills, it is worthwhile to consider the role of the Rules Committee in the aggregate as well. Because we are interested in describing Henderson's tenure as Speaker in relation to the other, purportedly more partisan, Speakers of the era, an informative picture may be painted by examining the variation in both special rules and their amendment restrictions over the course of time. Of perhaps the most interest is this—the Speaker to take fullest advantage of special rules throughout the partisan era was neither Reed nor Cannon, but rather Crisp (in the 53rd Congress). Henderson's use of special rules in the 56th and 57th Congresses was on par with that of Reed's in the 54th and 55th, with a subsequent up-tick during Cannon's tenure in the 58th to 61st Congresses. According to Roberts and Smith (2003b), Henderson's Rules Committee employed rules with amending restrictions as much or more frequently than all previous Speakers. Thus, at least in the aggregate, Henderson does not appear to have differed significantly from prior Speakers in terms of special rules usage.

The final point we wish to make in our discussion of Henderson's management of the House's floor agenda has to do with the broader question of party dominance. The two case studies we presented provide a flavor of the manner in which Henderson and the Republican leadership administered affairs on a couple of particularly salient pieces of legislation. However, we arrived at these two instances largely through a reading of secondary sources. Thus, a particularly important question remains. To what extent was such activity systematic? Our citation of two examples certainly does not preclude a picture of a generally weak Speaker on other issues that came before the 56th and 57th Houses.

In light of this, we conducted an exhaustive electronic search of the New York Times, examining each story in which David B. Henderson was mentioned in either the headline or the full text of an article during the period of his speakership. Between the stories resulting from this search and a reading of secondary sources such as Hoing (1957), we identified a number of additional occasions in which the Republican machine dominated the proceedings of the House. Perhaps of more importance is that beyond one case these searches provide no indication of leadership contrary to the strong-party picture that was typically painted during this era. That is, we found only one other case in which the leadership was defeated, and the discussion of this case is remarkable in that it focuses almost exclusively on how surprising the defeat was. A brief discussion of this incident will give an impression of the extent to which contemporaries viewed Henderson and his associates as the dominant center of power in the House.

The substance of the issue surrounded an amendment to the Naval Appropriations bill. The vote went contrary to the wishes of the leadership, and the postmortem discussion centered on the fact that before defeat on the beet sugar amendment to the Cuban reciprocity bill and the amendment in question here, "the Speaker and his aides were looked upon with an awe and dread which cannot be realized outside of Washington. The country has probably no adequate conception even yet of the courage it took to oppose the organization of the House." Henderson and his coterie of lieutenants "were regarded as invincible," and members were said to have great "dread of the Speaker" (New York Times, May 21, 1902, p. 8). By opposing the party machine, members believed they were risking their careers—and with good reason. For instance, Henderson was reported to have decided on recognition rights for members' bills dealing with local matters as a function of their support of the party. It was said that "Mr. Henderson has the reputation of not being a man to trifle with" (New York Times, April 1, 1902, p. 3). Furthermore, charges of arbitrary rulings on matters of even private legislation were not unheard of during Henderson's speakership (New York Times, February 10, 1900, p. 5). Months after the two defeats we identify here, and subsequent to Henderson's announcement declining renomination to Congress, the Times continued to discuss his methods, placing particular emphasis on the objections surrounding the manner in which he accorded recognition to members wishing to call up their bills for consideration (New York Times, September 21, 1902, p. 3).

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS UNDER SPEAKER HENDERSON

An implication of CPG is that in periods of heightened partisanship, when the conditions of strong party leadership are increasingly met, the majority leadership will take steps to solidify their control of features of House organization such as the committee system. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the appointments to committees made by Henderson to ascertain whether a similar pattern held true in this earlier time.

In the first place, it is evident that Henderson had no qualms with significant numeric deck stacking on the committees of central interest to the party's interest, such as Appropriations and Ways and Means. Despite the Republican Party's share of seats in the House having shrunk to much lower levels in the 56th House (their margin over the Democrats was only about one-third that of the 55th House), committee ratios were only slightly modified at the margins, with strong bias in favor of the majority party.
maintained on Appropriations (11–6 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th) and Ways and Means (11–6 in the 55th, 10–6 in the 56th). The Rules Committee throughout this time traditionally had only five members, three of whom were majority-party members (the committee was, of course, chaired by the Speaker). Other prominent committees such as Merchant Marine and Fisheries (8–5 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th), Rivers and Harbors (9–7 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th), Foreign Affairs (9–6 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th), and Military Affairs (9–6 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th) saw their majority margins either remain the same or increase, while the margins of Judiciary (11–6 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 55th), Banking and Currency (12–5 in the 55th, 10–7 in the 56th), Interstate and Foreign Commerce (12–5 in the 55th, 11–6 in the 56th) were decreased somewhat, with a strong majority bias remaining in effect.

At the start of the 56th Congress, two new, prominent committees were filled from the ground up. These were Census and Insular Affairs. In both cases, and perhaps not surprisingly, the ratios were set in favor of the majority party (10–7 on Insular Affairs and 8–5 on Census). Chosen to head each of these panels were leading members of the Republican Conference. Albert J. Hopkins (Ill.) assumed the chairmanship of the Census Committee, while Henry Allen Cooper of Wisconsin took the helm of Insular Affairs. Interestingly, the new Insular Affairs Committee was termed a “committee of Chairmen” in that the heads of a number of prominent committees were placed on this panel (New York Times, December 19, 1899, p. 7).

Beyond committee ratios, at least equal consequence is the ideological composition of committees. That is, the majority party can see an advantage by appointing like-minded members, in addition to controlling a committee through greater numbers. The degree to which Henderson filled vacancies on the more notable committees with more conservative Republicans may tell us something about this dynamic, though it is important to bear in mind that a number of other factors are at play in the politics of committee assignments. In the future, we plan to conduct a more systematic analysis, along the lines of Lawrence, Maltzman, and Wahlbecker (2001), to more fully account for the competing forces at work in the assignment process.

At this juncture, we simply look at the DW-NOMINATE scores of newly appointed members to the committees identified in advance by the New York Times as having “important vacancies”: Ways and Means, Appropriations, Judiciary, Banking and Currency, Rivers and Harbors, Foreign Affairs, and Military Affairs (New York Times, December 6, 1899, p. 8). We also look at Census and Insular Affairs, given their status as new committees in the 56th House. By and large, the pattern squares with general expectations based on the partisan import of each panel. Appropriations, Banking and Currency, and Ways and Means all saw a group of new members appointed who, in the aggregate, were more extreme than the party median. In contrast, traditionally constituency-oriented committees such as Rivers and Harbors, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and Insular Affairs saw members of a more centrist orientation appointed to fill vacant positions. It is important to bear in mind that, in this Congress, the separation condition of CPG theory was fully met in the NOMINATE scores of the two parties—the most liberal Republican was still to the right of the most conservative Democrat.

In summary, we can say that Henderson appears to have filled committee seats on the control committees with loyal, conservative Republicans. This is further evidenced in the one vacancy he filled on the Rules Committee—Charles Grosvenor of Ohio was in the 76th percentile of his party—more conservative than fully three-quarters of his fellow partisans—and was the choice of Henderson for this sole vacancy on Rules, along with the chairmanship of Rivers and Harbors, of which Grosvenor had not even been a member in the previous Congress. It may not be a coincidence that Grosvenor was a leading member of the Ohio delegation, whose support was seen as integral in assuring Henderson’s election to the Speakership. This latter case is suggestive of one of the bases for our interest in conducting a more systematic analysis of assignments in the 56th and 57th Houses.

Henderson’s Rulings from the Chair

Another area in which to look for influence on the part of the Speaker is his parliamentary rulings—the decisions offered from the chair as the House’s presiding officer. While Henderson was by all accounts not the brilliant parliamentary tactician of his predecessor Reed, and likely did not need to be, observers have noted at least two rulings worthy of discussion. Further study of Henderson’s rulings is warranted, and in the future we plan to extend our analysis in this area by examining the votes surrounding each instance in which a parliamentary question of order was settled during his tenure.

Riddick (1949, 113) notes that in the spring of 1902 members questioned the prerogative of the Rules Committee to report a special rule on the basis that, because such a resolution sets aside the House’s standing rules, positive action would require a two-thirds vote. In his precedents, Hinds details Henderson’s ruling, which was based on such an action having been undertaken repeatedly in the past and the question “is well settled” (Hinds 1907, vol. 4, § 3169).

A second ruling of perhaps more long-standing consequence owing to its original nature had to do with quorum counting. Champ Clark
(1920, 199–200), the Democratic successor of Joseph G. Cannon, identifies Henderson's "elaborate and well-considered opinion" on exactly what constitutes a quorum in the House. There had apparently been some longstanding debate as to how members-elect should be counted. In an era in which absenteeism was notoriously high, the mechanics of vote counting were of much importance (as evidenced in Reed's historic ruling that all members present in the chamber should be counted). In this instance, Henderson's ruling held that only those "members elect sworn in and living who have neither resigned nor been expelled" should be figured into a quorum count (Cannon 1936, vol. 6, § 638).

THE TWILIGHT OF HENDERSON'S SPEAKERSHIP

A final aspect of Henderson's terms in the Speaker's chair that merits attention occurred on the last day the 57th House spent in session. The traditional practice of the House had been to adopt a resolution of thanks for the Speaker's service, usually offered by the minority leader. Yet as Alexander (1916, 74–75) notes, "The passage of the resolution has occasionally needed the gag of the previous question." This was true of the resolution of thanks offered by Majority Leader Payne—apparently some members interested in speaking were so thwarted, and an attempt was made to have a recorded vote on the resolution but to no avail. Unfortunately, the cause of member resentment in this case cannot be known, and we are left to imagine just what may have been revealed should they have been allowed to speak.3

Summing Up Henderson

This preliminary look at David B. Henderson as Speaker of the House, while advancing our knowledge of a key intermediate figure of the partisan era of the House, has also raised a number of important questions. A more detailed look at his speakership is necessary before we can speak with greater certainty to the issue of partisan power. While it is evident that observers and participants viewed the House under his leadership as a body wholly controlled by the Republican machine headed by Henderson, because of his relative obscurity it is somewhat difficult to find accounts that lend significant credence to this view. Clearly, on a number of occasions, the influence of party power was evident, and the sentiment of the time indicates that this was likely the case across a broader range of issues. But the degree to which this was characteristic of his leadership in terms of systematic effects on the policy-making process remains an issue for further analysis.

Chapter 18

The Motion to Recommit in the House: The Creation, Evisceration, and Restoration of a Minority Right

DONALD R. WOLFENSBERGER

The fact is that a motion to recommit is intended to give the minority one chance to fully express their views so long as they are germane.... The whole purpose of this motion to recommit is to have a record vote upon the program of the minority. That is the main purpose of the motion to recommit.

—Speaker Frederick H. Gillett (R-Mass.)
October 7, 1919

Introduction

In 1909 House Speaker Joseph Gurney Cannon (R-Ill.) temporarily staved off an attempt by liberal Democrats and insurgent Republicans to dethrone him as chair of the House Rules Committee by secretly blessing a substitute package of internal House reforms offered by a conservative Democrat. One of the changes offered by Cannon's Democratic ally amended House rules to give an opponent of a bill a final opportunity to amend it by offering a motion to recommit with instructions just before the vote on final passage of the measure.

Under previous practice, the Speaker had discretion to recognize a member of his choosing to offer a motion to recommit, and this was often a supporter of the legislation and a member of the Speaker's own party. The new guarantee was enforced by a provision prohibiting the Rules Committee from reporting a special rule that denied opponents the first right to offer the motion to recommit.

The 1909 rule remained essentially intact for over a half century. In 1932 Speaker John Nance Garner (D-Tex.) issued a ruling that firmly established the right as belonging to a minority party opponent of a bill, as opposed to any opponent, regardless of party (Cannon 1936).
might endanger national security, the failure to pass a post office appropria-
tions bill might provoke the most ire among constituents whose mail service
would be disrupted. The GEE analysis should help to account for correlation
induced by these kinds of unobserved factors.

31. Binder (2003, 8), who examines lawmaking in the post-World War II
era, suggests that her measure may have different effects for earlier time peri-
ods. Political parties in Congresses of yesteryear may have had greater stakes in
legislative accomplishments than do parties of today. Polarization might have
led to (or been a symptom of) more disciplined parties that sought to establish
substantive legislative records for an advantage in electoral competition.

Notes to Chapter 16

This is a revised version of the paper presented at the History of Congress
Conference, December 5–6, 2003, in San Diego, California. We thank David
Brady, Jeffery Jenkins, Mathew D. McCubbins, Nathan Monroe, and Barbara
Sinclair for helpful comments and suggestions.

1. See also Anderson and Doherty (2003) for a discussion underlying the
partisan motivations behind the adoption of the Australian ballot in the late
19th century.

2. In examining elections in this period we sought to choose a sample that
was representative of elections in this period. This was complicated by the
large number of “moving parts” in elections during this era. We see the grad-
ual decline in the practice of rotation in office, the replacement of the party
ballot with the Australian ballot, the party realignment of the 1890s, a gradual
shift to the direct primary, and a gradual increase in legislative careerism.
Thus, in selecting representative elections, we were choosing a moving target,
and so we selected elections that reflected the diversity of the period. We have
elections before and after the adoption of the Australian ballot, before and
after the 1890s realignment, before and after the advent of the direct primary,
and with wide variation in turnover and the proportion of incumbents seek-
ing reelection. We also sought to minimize the effects of reapportionment by
not choosing elections conducted in years ending in 2. Despite the diversity
of the elections in our sample, our empirical results are remarkably consistent
across the years we have chosen, which makes us reasonably confident that our
sample selection is not driving our conclusions.

3. Note that we use a simple dichotomy of whether or not the challenger
held previous elective office as our measure of challenger quality. We chose
not to use more nuanced measures because the simple dichotomy performs as
well as more sophisticated measures in other studies of challenger quality, thus
the dichotomous measure makes inference more parsimonious without suffer-
ing any substantive loss. Further, it would be extremely difficult to construct a
scale measure that would compare the “quality” of previous offices held in this
period.

4. The Political Graveyard Web site can be accessed at http://www
.politicalgraveyard.com.

5. In this chapter we followed the lead of Jacobson (1989) by assuming
that candidates for whom we could not find candidate-quality information
were nonquality. We have also estimated the reported models using three ap-
proaches: listwise deletion, assuming missing cases are nonquality, and multiple
imputation. The substantive results are identical in all three approaches.

6. The party of incumbent is coded 1 for Democrats, −1 for Republicans.
Incumbent running is coded 1 for Republican incumbents, 0 for open seats,
and 1 for Democratic incumbents. Democratic quality advantage is coded −1
when the Republican party has a quality advantage (Republican is incumbent or
quality challenger and opponent is neither), 0 if neither party has an advantage
(incumbent vs. quality challenger, two quality opponents in an open seat, or
two political novices), and 1 when the Democratic Party has a quality advan-
tage (Democrat is incumbent or quality challenger and opponent is neither).
Note that we are missing one variable in the Cox and Katz model (lagged-
quality advantage) for all years but 1896. However, we find no substantive dif-
ference in our results for 1896 when we omit the lagged-quality measure, so
we are reasonably confident that this omission does not affect our findings.

7. We also estimated this equation as an ordered probit model and found
no substantive differences in the two models.

Notes to Chapter 17

We are grateful for the comments of Jennifer Merolla, Rick Wilson, and
numerous participants at the 2003 History of Congress (San Diego, California)
and the 2004 Southern Political Science Association (New Orleans, Louisiana)
conferences. Portions of the data used in the analysis were generously pro-
vided by Keith Poole, Jason Roberts, and Charles Stewart.

1. A number of accounts attach great weight to the regional nature of the
conflict (see, for instance, Peters 1997, 75).

2. Fuller’s depiction is incorrect on the composition of the Rules Commit-
tee. The committee was composed of three majority-party and two minor-
ity-party members. In his two terms as Speaker, Henderson served alongside
Dalzell and Grovenor.

3. Interestingly, these resolutions of thanks were not only traditionally bi-
partisan enterprises but bipartisan even during Cannon’s speakership.

Notes to Chapter 18

1. Speaker Reed, ruling from the chair, made his remark when overruling
a point of order against his decision to count for a quorum those members
present but not responding to their names—thereby eliminating the minori-
ty’s disappearing quorum tactic.