My
areas of specialization are modern philosophy with special emphasis on
Kant, the early modern history of science, and certain aspects of
practical reasoning.
My dissertation was a commentary
on Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science on a paragraph by paragraph basis, with
the Critique of Pure Reason (instead of the
natural sciences or Kant’s pre-critical writings)
being the central perspective on that work.
The purpose of my 'professorial dissertation' (the German Habilitation)
was to provide a detailed account of the relationship
between rational requirements and overriding reasons for action,
taking Kant as a starting point, then expanding into present
discussions and dealing with the works of John Broome, Thomas Scanlon,
and Jürgen Habermas, among others.
My current research focuses on Kant’s Theory of Normativity, its cognitive as well as its volitional, and its emotive aspects. What sets Kant apart from his predecessors, is that on the one hand he did not build on theories of sensations, primary or secondary qualities, human inclinations or desires, and that on the other hand he no longer took the concept of perfection or perfectibility as the basic normative concept. In contrast to these empiricist and rationalist approaches, Kant established a new way of thinking, which he called the ‘critical path’, by taking the concept of a judgment as the centerpiece of philosophy as a whole. I am interested in Kant's point of view that we must take if and only if our claims are to be more than merely idiosyncratic expressions. My question is: how can we make sense of Kant's raising the quaestio iuris, or even appreciate – despite his treatment in terms of ‘faculties’ – his attempts to justify standards of objective knowledge, standards of rational and of reasonable action, and standards of aesthetic appreciation?
I have taught courses on what is generally referred to as „British empiricism” (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Shaftesbury) and „continental rationalism” (Descartes, Leibniz), as well as on certain aspects of German idealism (Fichte, Schelling), and late modern philosophy in general, at all levels of the undergraduate curriculum. I have also been involved in the supervision and teaching of M.A. students for a number of years, teaching courses on transcendental arguments, modern theories of practical reasoning, and moral philosophy, among others.My main interest in working with students concerns the advancement of their thinking about philosophical problems, rather than charting philosophical solutions. Philosophers from Plato to Rawls and beyond provide answers that we quite often do not find convincing at all. But looking behind these sometimes odd answers and finding out what sort of questions these people had, is in many cases much more revealing and even thrilling than the straightforward sense and surface of their arguments. If we venture on the historical and systematic background of these theories we most likely find problems that affect and captivate us – and sometimes we can even find a perspective that opens up a reasonable solution.
