THE VIETNAM WAR

BACK TO HOMEPAGE

BACK TO UNDERGRADUATE

BACK TO GRADUATE

DATES TO REMEMBER

[updated due dates for Summer 2008]

June 9, Monday, Email/Information Assignment Due

June 23, Monday, lst Writing Assignment Due

July 7, Monday, 2nd Writing Assignment Due

July 21, Monday, 3rd Writing Assignment Due

(send essays, stapled to the cover sheet provided by Distance Ed, directly to me)

THE VIETNAM WAR

Department of Political Science

(POLI J391B for undergraduate credit

POLI J794A for graduate credit)

PROFESSOR JEREL ROSATI

803 777-2981

rosati@sc.edu

http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/index.htm (website)

The syllabus, contact info, and other helpful information on writing essays can be found on my website.

The course is built around the television series Vietnam: A Television History. The object of this course is for you to learn about a very significant episode in the evolution of Indochina, America, and the world. Specifically, the purpose of the course is to:

1. provide you with in-depth knowledge of the Vietnam War, from its historical origins to its eventual resolution;

2. provide you with a firm understanding of America*s role in the Vietnam War;

3. familiarize you with different perspectives and interpretations of the Vietnam War; and

4. have you think about the societal and global implications of the Vietnam War.

MEET YOUR PROFESSOR

Jerel Rosati is a Professor of political science and international studies and has been a member of the Department of Political Science (formerly Department of Government and International Studies) at Carolina since 1982. He has a great love of knowledge and learning about the world and human affairs. His intellectual interests range from American politics and history, United States foreign policy, the Vietnam War and the sixties to the dynamics of world politics and global change, the nature of human interaction, and political psychology. His area of specialization is the theory and practice of foreign policy, focusing on the United States policymaking process, decision-making theory, and the political psychological study of human cognition. He has been awarded the Outstanding Professor of the Year in the Humanities and Social Sciences by the South Carolina (Honors) College, the Outstanding Teacher in International Studies in the Department of Government & International Studies, Excellence in Teaching by the University of South Carolina Alpha Chapter of the Mortar Board Honor Society, and Outstanding Teacher in Political Science by the American Political Science Association and Pi Sigma Alpha (The National Political Science Honor Society). In addition to the usual undergraduate and graduate students, he has also been awarded, and participated in, a number of instructional grants at the state and federal level (usually through the U.S. Department of State) as Academic Director, Field Director, and/or Project Director where he has taught students and scholars from all over the world, including Bulgarians, Chinese, Israelis and Palestinians, Somalis, Master’s of International Business students, and high school teachers. This summer he was the Program Director and Academic Director of a U.S. Department of State Fulbright American Studies Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy for 18 scholars-practitioners from all over the world (see his website for more information on the Institute). He has been a Visiting Professor at Somalia National University in Mogadishu and Visiting Scholar at China’s Foreign Affairs College in Beijing. He is the author of over forty articles and chapters, as well as five books including The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (3^rd edition and translated in Mandarin Chinese), The Power of Human Needs in World Society, Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change, and Readings in the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. He also has been a Research Associate in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service, President of the International Studies Association's Foreign Policy Analysis Section, and President of the Southern region of the International Studies Association. He is happily married and the proud father of three children (and a fourth step-daughter, one cat, and one dog) and enjoys travel, athletics, music, reading, good company, and relaxing. He came of age during the early seventies as an undergraduate at U.C.L.A when the events surrounding the Vietnam War and Watergate reached a crescendo, which had a profound impact on his intellectual and personal development to the present day.

REQUIREMENTS

This course is open for both undergraduate and graduate credit (Note: the course will not count for credit toward a graduate degree in the Department of Government & International Studies). Therefore, the requirements vary depending on the credit and are more demanding at the graduate level. There are three sets of requirements.

1. VIEWING. The television series Vietnam: A Television History consists of fourteen episodes.

2. READING. The reading will complement the television program and will increase your learning potential. The following books — all in paperback — are required by all students (many of the books can be found at your local bookstore or library; all are available from the Distance Education Bookstore):

Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997)

Steve Cohen, ed., Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History (New York: Knopf, 1983)

The following additional book (paperback) should be purchased by those taking the course for graduate credit:

James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War: Vietnam's Struggle for Independence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

3. THREE WRITING ASSIGNMENTS. Every few weeks a major assignment will be due. The three assignments require written responses to essay questions. Those taking the course for graduate credit will be expected to write longer and higher quality essays utilizing additional material.

RECOMMENDED STUDY PROCEDURE (Please read carefully)

Obviously, there is no one perfect study method that is appropriate for all individuals. Therefore, the following is purely suggestive — you ought to refine it to fit your individual needs.

First, before you actually view an episode of Vietnam, you should do some of the required reading. In this way you will develop some foundation which will allow you to comprehend and digest the video material more fully. You should emphasize those materials which are more historically oriented (e.g., the Karnow book) to provide you with the information and background necessary to maximize your learning potential.

Second, view the appropriate episode. Pay attention not only to the visual action, but also to the narrative. Try to relate what you have read in preparation for the episode to what you are watching and hearing. Be an active viewer!

Finally, complete the required reading. As a result of the initial reading and the television viewing, you should now begin to understand more fully and retain the variety of information and perspective that are offered (e.g., the Cohen book).

Hopefully, each week you will be able to build on the knowledge and understanding that you have obtained as a result of the previous weeks.

WRITING ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Please read carefully)

Every few weeks a major assignment is due. Each of the three assignments will entail answering one essay question from a selection of questions.

Essay Content

The essay should be typed, “DOUBLE-SPACED” on regular white sheets of paper . It should be composed of three basic parts.

–the cover page followed by the essay:

i) introduction —-You need to introduce the topic of the question you selected and mention how you plan to address it.

ii) body of the paper —-You should highlight and discuss the "major points" or factors that directly address the question. This should flow naturally from the introduction. Historical and factual material should be integrated only if they support your major points. Given the space limitations, do not get bogged down in detail or trivial points. Emphasize analysis, not description.

iii) conclusion—-You should briefly summarize the major theme(s) of the essay and/or draw some concluding implications.

Remember, it is an "analytical" essay—a "think-piece." The focus should be on analysis and explanation, not description. BE AWARE THAT AN ESSAY THAT JUST DESCRIBES (OR PREDOMINANTLY DESCRIBES) WHAT HAPPENED IS A POOR ESSAY. The essay should be organized around explaining “WHY” something happened. Each paragraph after the introductory paragraph should discuss a key explanation or point.

The essay should make explicit reference to ALL of the readings and the videos (whenever you quote or provide specific information obtained from one of the readings) to demonstrate you have in fact done the reading and understand what you have read. Therefore, FOOTNOTES are to be included following the text, “with appropriate bibliographic citations and reference to pages.” When making a reference to an article in the Cohen-edited book, footnote the specific article, not just the book.

Essay Style

The essay should be well-written and well-organized—in other words, clear and coherent. The purpose behind the introduction and the conclusion is to promote clarity and coherence. The transition between one paragraph and another must be smooth, and the discussion within a paragraph must be clear and concise.

Therefore, THINK about what you are going to say and how you are going to say it. THE BURDEN IS ON YOU to be as clear and understandable as possible.

[SEE THE ILLUSTRATION OF AN EXCELLENT ESSAY AT THE BACK OF THE SYLLABUS written for a previous class. There is no one correct way to write a strong essay. This is just “one illustration” of an undergraduate essay which is excellent in terms of content and analysis, as well as organization and writing style as discussed above and below. But it should give you an idea of my expectations of excellence when you write your essays.]

Essay Requirements for Graduate Credit

Students taking the course for graduate credit will be expected to write a slightly longer, more comprehensive essay that is more powerful and polished (relative to those taking the course at the undergraduate level). Students taking the course for graduate credit are encouraged to utilize additional materials beyond the required reading to provide greater background and depth to the essay (see, e.g., the recommended readings in Cohen). This will entail some research and use of the library if want to increase the likelihood of receiving a higher grade.

Some DO's and DONT's for the Essays

1. Follow directions and guidelines above. READ MORE THEN ONCE AND CAREFULLY.

2. Have a COVER PAGE with your name, the class and section number, the essay number (first, second, or third), and the specific question you are answering. USE THE COVER PAGE DISTANCE ED PROVIDES YOU!

3. Avoid the first person (use of "I").

4. Do not identify with the U.S. government (avoid "we", "our", etc.).

5. Have the first paragraph be an introductory paragraph that makes it clear to the reader what topic you are addressing

6. Each paragraph should express one major idea or point.

7. Each paragraph should clearly follow from the previous paragraph.

8. End with a concluding paragraph.

9. The whole essay should be organized so that there is a logical progression from the beginning to end.

10. ANALYZE AND EXPLAIN; DO NOT DESCRIBE, except to support your point.

11. Discuss and cite the readings in support of the point that you are making.

12. Footnote all quotes and statements of fact (not just quotes), and try to integrate the videos.

13. Footnote every required reading at least once.

14. Check your spelling, grammar, and sentence structure.

15. Keep within the page length limitations.

16. Finally, JUST STAPLE THE COVER PAGE AND ESSAY–no fancy covers please.

Mail Essay

The assignments should be SEND TO ME.

STAPLE YOUR ESSAY TO THE COVER SHEET PROVIDED BY DISTANCE ED.

Late essays (postmarked after the due date) will be accepted; however, be aware that, due to the additional time you have to work on the essay, my expectations about its quality will increase each day it is late.

Just staple the paper and mail it in with the appropriate cover sheet (no fancy binders). You are required to make and RETAIN A COPY for yourself in case of loss in the mail.

I will grade and mail the essays to you as soon as possible. Place your name, address, phone numbers, and email address on the cover sheet.

Mail papers to: Jerel Rosati

ATTN: POLI 391B or 794A

Department of Political Science

University of South Carolina

Gambrell Hall

Columbia, SC 29208

GRADING

The three essays are worth 30%, 30%, and 40%, in that order. I will evaluate each essay based on the quality of substantive knowledge, the quality of analysis, and the ability to communicate demonstrated in addressing the question. Essays will be mailed to you with coments to give you the opportunity to improve the quality of the next writing assignment. The final grade will be based on the quality of the work throughout the three essays.

I try to reward both continuity in quality and/or growth in the quality of work. In other words, an individual who begins poorly but subsequently continues to improve over time will be rewarded because he or she demonstrates intellectual growth.

I will try to get the papers back to you in a timely fashion so you can use the feedback to strengthen the next essay. Please be patient: sometimes I grade faster, sometimes I grade slower (sometimes I am out of town for example).

DATES TO REMEMBER

[updated due dates for Summer 2008]

June 9, Monday, Email/Information Assignment Due

June 23, Monday, lst Writing Assignment Due

July 7, Monday, 2nd Writing Assignment Due

July 21, Monday, 3rd Writing Assignment Due

(send essays, stapled to the cover sheet provided by Distance Ed, directly to me)

CONTACTING ME AND INTERACTING

The best way to contact me is through email. My email address is:

rosati@sc.edu

If you have any questions or complications that I should be aware, feel free to contact me. I am good about checking my email and responding throughout the workweek. I am much less likely to check my email during the weekend.

You can also try to call me at work, but my summer hours are very irregular and uncertain. And I am much slower to check my voicemail then I am my email. My office phone number is (803) 777-2981.

EMAIL/INFORMATION ASSIGNMENT. Once you are enrolled in the course and get this syllabus, I want you to email me the following information (fax or mail if you don’t use email):

6. email address [is it operable over the summer; if not, try to sign-up for a free email service like juno (at www.juno.com) or yahoo (at www.yahoo.com)]

8. and any other information you might want to communicate (like why are taking this course; or some information about you that may be helpful for me to have).

This information is absolutely essential and allows me to contact you if necessary. I cannot understate how helpful it would be to have a functioning email address that would allow us to interact easily.

view TV episode 1 (Dr. Rosati interviews Dr. Paul Kattenburg, USC Jacobson Professor of Public Affairs, former diplomat, and author of The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy. Dr. Kattenburg has been involved with the politics of Southeast Asia and Indochina for more than 30 years.)

FIRST WRITING ASSIGNMENT. The essay should be no more then 2 pages in length for undergraduates; and no more then 3 pages for graduates (not counting endnotes, using 1 inch margins and normal font sizes). Answer one of the following questions.

a) The question of why the United States became involved in Vietnam might be answered solely by examining American policy. But it can also be approached by looking at American involvement as part of an historical process that included the Chinese, the French, and the Japanese. In an essay, analyze and compare to what extent America*s involvement and experience was similar to the experience of France in Vietnam.

b) When and why did the French colonize Indochina? Why were the French unsuccessful in maintaining Vietnam as part of its colonial empire? What were the historical and immediate reasons?

c) Why did the U.S. government support the French in Indochina after World War II? Given the French position at Dienbienphu, why was the United States reluctant to intervene militarily?

d) Why were the Geneva negotiations held? What was agreed to in the Geneva Accords? What role did the Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. play? What, if anything, was the impact?

e) It is often argued that American policymakers were naive concerning the nature of the Indochina conflict. That is, if Americans had known more about the Vietnamese — about their traditions of resistance to foreign powers, about the intensity of their nationalism, about what their communism really represented — they might have been less willing to commit themselves to a war in Southeast Asia. Do you agree? Why? Why not? Be sure to discuss American perceptions of Vietnam and the Vietnamese.

SECOND WRITING ASSIGNMENT. The essay should be no more then 2 pages in length for undergraduates; no more then 3 pages for graduates (not counting endnotes, using 1 inch margins and normal font sizes). Answer one of the following questions.

a) People endlessly debated the nature of the conflict in Vietnam. Some emphasized Communist "aggression" against South Vietnam. Others emphasized that it was a "civil war" fought between factions of Vietnamese that disagreed on how Vietnam ought to be governed. What light do the readings and the television series shed on this important issue? What implications does this have for America*s involvement?

b) What concrete interests, if any, did America have in Vietnam? To what extent was the United States in Vietnam to defend concepts such as "freedom," "democracy," and "self-determination"? Compare the goals of American foreign policy with its foreign policy action in Vietnam.

c) Students of American history have often studied the Cold War and the Vietnam War as two separate “events” dominating two different chronological periods. Is this separation justified? Or can the Vietnam War be more profitably understood as a part of or an outcome of the Cold War?

d) The Vietnam War has often been described as a “civil war,” fought between factions of Vietnamese that disagreed on how Vietnam ought to be governed. This description of the war as a “civil” conflict has been used to discredit American involvement. What evidence is there to refute or support this assessment of the war as a struggle between Vietnamese?

e) Discuss the concepts of “communism” and “nationalism” as they related to the Vietnamese. Exactly what did these concepts mean or refer to? How important were these concepts in motivating the enemies of America? What implications did this have for American foreign policy?

f) Examine American conduct of the war from a purely military perspective. What strategy did the Americans initially follow during the French Indochina War and how did that strategy change during the 1960s? Which strategies were most effective and which least to the task at hand? Is there any evidence that American military policies were counterproductive? Why?

g) Explain the historical meaning of the Tet offensive of 1968. What impact did it have? Was it a decisive engagement? Was it a major turning point in the war? Why?

h) During the mid-1960s, many within the Johnson administration, including the president himself, began to reassess the American posture in Vietnam. What factors influenced that reassessment? Was it based on a rethinking of long-standing attitudes, such as those inherited from the Cold War? Or was it based on more pragmatic, short-term considerations, such as the Tet offensive, the peace movement, or the perceived failure of American bombing?

review relevant parts of Karnow (use the index; especially when multiple pages are listed)

THIRD WRITING ASSIGNMENT. The final essay should be no more then 2 and one-half pages in length for undergraduates; no more then 3 and one-half pages for graduates (not counting endnotes, using 1 inch margins and normal font sizes). Answer one of the following questions.

a) For all their differences — real and apparent — in handling the war in Vietnam, Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson were in many ways very similar in their response to the conflict. Examine some of the continuities between these presidential administrations. Consider, for example, how Nixon and Johnson defined and analyzed the conflict. How were the two Presidents and administrations different in their handling of the Vietnam War?

b) Was Vietnamization a reasonable policy, with some reasonable chance of success? Or was it doomed to failure? Was it designed to produce victory, or was it evidence that the American military effort had been turned back? Why? Exactly what did “Peace with Honor” mean?

c) Evaluate the following statement: “Vietnam*s future was settled on the battlefield, not at the conference table.”

d) Evaluate the role of the media--especially television--in the Vietnam War. Was television coverage of the war balanced and objective? Did the media lead public opinion, reflect it, or follow it? Did the media help bring the war to an end or make it last longer? Please explain. Be sure to consider how the media reported the war during the fifties and early sixties.

e) Evaluate the role of the peace movement in the Vietnam War. How and why did the antiwar movement grow? What was the relationship between the peace movement and the mass public throughout society? Did the antiwar movement lead public opinion, reflect it, or follow it? Did the the peace movement help bring the war to an end or make it last longer? Please explain.

f) The Vietnam War had an enormous impact on domestic life and politics in the United States; and America*s conduct of the war, in turn, was deeply affected by domestic considerations. Examine this reciprocal relationship between domestic politics and the Vietnam War. What domestic events most influenced the conduct of the war? And in what important ways did the war shape domestic politics?

g) The United States and the Republic of Vietnam were officially allies. But this did not keep them from looking at the war from a different perspective and coming to different conclusions about it. How did the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam see the conflict? What did South Vietnamese officials think of Americanization of the war? Of Vietnamization? Of the peace negotiations and the 1973 agreement? Of American policy from 1973 to 1975? Did the substance of the U.S.-Republic of Vietnam relationship change over time? How did their views and the relationship affect the American war effort?

h) The war in Southeast Asia was often criticized for being an immoral war. Looking back and evaluating the war based on moral criteria, what aspects of American (or Vietnamese) policy seem “immoral”? Why? Of what importance is this perspective for understanding the Vietnam War? Why?

i) The United States had a substantial presence in Southeast Asia for more than two decades. How would you summarize the impact of that presence on Vietnamese society? How were the lives of South Vietnamese peasants, Saigon residents, changed by the Americans? For the North Vietnamese? Were the changes only temporary, or more long-lasting? In the final analysis, did American involvement have a positive or negative impact on Southeast Asia?

j) Some scholars have argued that Vietnam was "Kennedy*s War," others that it was "Johnson*s War," and still others have been critical of Nixon*s conduct of the war. Yet one may question whether this presidential approach does justice to other factors that play a role in history. One such factor is the "people," or "democracy." To what extent were the American people responsible for American involvement and withdrawal in Vietnam? How? Why?

k) The Vietnam War finally ended for the United States in the mid-70s. Why? What brought the war to a close? Had the U.S. been militarily defeated? Had the protest movement successfully achieved its goal? Had American officials or the American people changed their minds about the war in some fundamental way?

l) To what extent can it be said that the so-called North Vietnamese won the war? What were the major successes? The major failures? What impact did the war have, and its legacy, on the country and the Vietnamese?

m) For students who actually went and participated in the Vietnam War: What were some of the points in this course that you believe were most important for understanding the evolution of the war? How do your experiences and observations compare with the information and analyses of the documentary film and the readings? Discuss and explain.

n) For students who are Vietnam War veterans: Discuss life in Vietnam and in America upon your return. To what extent do the readings and the video shed light on the life of a Veteran?

o) For Vietnamese students: Discuss life in Vietnam and in America since your arrival. To what extent do the readings and the video shed light on the life of a Vietnamese in Vietnam and America?

The United states government supported the French in Indochina after World War II, but when the French asked for American assistance in their fight at Dienbienphu, the United States was reluctant to intervene militarily. The reasons for the United States' assistance after World War 11 and their reluctance at Dienbienphu will be discussed by looking at three issues as follows: (1) the need for United States support and intervention, (2) those individuals in the United States who were either in favor of or opposed to support and intervention, and (3) the financial cost to the United States in terms of support and intervention.

The United States government supported the French in Indochina after World War 11 because of the threat of the spread of communism. The United States had given very little attention to Indochina since 1946 until the Communist triumph in China in late 1949.¹ The United States believed China and Russia were seeking to expand and become dominant in the world, therefore, it had to help Europe countries protect their freedom and independence. Because of this view, President Truman expanded American foreign policy by extending the containment of Communism, which until this time had focused on Europe, to Asia.²

Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, was a staunch supporter of the United States involvement. He saw the French effort in Indochina as a stand against Soviet expansion, and he argued in favor of U.S. aid to France. He stated, "Our policy is to support Bao Dai and the French in Indochina until we have time to help them establish a going concern."³ There were official American spokesmen who devised the "domino theory" warning that if Indochina fell to Communism, so would the other countries of Southeast Asia. This was reinforced by Senator Joseph McCarthy who stimulated an anti-Communism atmosphere, causing normally rational U.S. officials to go to excessive lengths to prove their loyalty and zeal to defeat the "Red menace. "⁴

By portraying the Indochina War as an anti-Communist crusade, the French secured considerable American aid. Because of the global stakes and that Indochina was viewed as a crucial arena, the United States became more determined than France to persevere in Indochina. This gave France an enormous amount of leverage because France continued to use U.S. funds but repeatedly rejected U.S. attempts to persuade them to conduct the war more effectively' as well as to give the anti-Communist Vietnamese greater independence. The French knew the Americans would continue to pay for their battle against Communism. By 1954, American aid made up nearly 80 percent of French expenditures on the conflict. During 1950 to 1954, the United States spent nearly $3 billion to assist the French in Indochina.⁵

When the French found themselves in a precarious position at Dienbienphu and asked for American aid, the United States was reluctant to intervene militarily. The French claimed that they desperately needed American military assistance at Dienbienphu to support their diplomacy at the upcoming Geneva negotiations. They were successful in winning over Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who proposed a plan labeled Operation Vulture which involved American bombers and fighter planes. Others, such as General Matthew Ridgway, army chief of staff, opposed the idea.⁶

President Eisenhower refused to become involved without the approval of Congress and the cooperation of Britain, both of which opposed intervention. Another reason for President Eisenhower's reluctance to intervene was because he had been elected on a pledge to end the war in Korea, which could have erupted into a bigger encounter with China. His closest aide, Sherman Adams, said: "Having avoided one total war with Red China the year before in Korea, when he had United Nations support, he was in no mood to provoke another one in Indochina without the British and other Western allies.⁷

It is obvious from the readings and television viewings that American policymakers believed that Communism was expanding, and this led to United States support and intervention to prevent this expansion. Such an anti-Communism view was adopted and endorsed by numerous United States officials. But while the French continued to use an enormous amount of U.S. funds, they also continued to ignore the advice offered by the United States and conditions progressively worsened. Preventing a defeat at Dienbienphu was critical to the French. General Walter Bedel Smith, who headed the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks stated, "You don't win at the conference table what you've lost on the battlefield."⁸Reluctant to militarily intervene, President Eisenhower and the United States realized a compromise was in order which contributed to the Geneva Accords.

1. Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost - and Won: America's Intervention in Viet Nam's Twin Struggles, Rev. Ed. (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993), p. 43.

5. Lomperis, p. 41; Steven Cohen, Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to A Television History (New York: Knopf, 1983), p. 34.