Extending the Three- and Four-Headed Eagles: The Foreign Policy Orientations of American Elites During the 80s and 90s

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With the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years, there has been a resurgence in examining the beliefs of the public and their role in U.S. foreign policy. The most extensive of these studies has been conducted by Holsti and Rosenau who have found first three and then four competing schools of thought. Our purpose is to build off Holsti and Rosenau's analyses and extend their argument. Research based on the content analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1980–1989 demonstrates that there is more diversity and complexity in the range and content of beliefs held by American leaders than Holsti and Rosenau have yet been able to capture through their “three-” and “four-headed eagles.” Although the three-headed eagle serves as a useful scheme for categorizing the broad foreign policy perspectives of American leaders, it de-emphasizes important differences in beliefs and ignores at least two foreign policy orientations that exist within their general categories. This is not a mere academic exercise, for it sheds light on the level of diversity and complexity of elite beliefs, which enriches an understanding of the politics of U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam. A preliminary examination of foreign policy and national opinion journals from 1990 to 1994 indicates that American elites are changing and adapting while at the same time, they are absorbing profound global changes into their prevailing belief systems, as predicted by the political psychological literature. This suggests that the diversity and complexity present in the 80s is likely to persist and grow throughout the 90s. Our research also suggests the importance of developing alternative methods to complement reliance on survey research in order to capture more fully the diversity and complexity of the foreign policy beliefs of Americans.

KEY WORDS: elite attitudes; attitude change; ideology; foreign policy orientations; U.S. foreign policy; content analysis; foreign policy and national opinion journals
Since the end of the Vietnam War, there has been a renewed interest among scholars and analysts in examining the beliefs of the public and the impacts these beliefs have on U.S. foreign policy. Attention has been refocused on what Gabriel Almond (1960) and James Rosenau (1961) argued a decade before the war’s end: that public opinion—the beliefs held by the mass public and the elites of society—affects the political agenda and the boundaries of legitimate political discourse, shapes the beliefs of individuals who become governmental officials, and influences the decisions of policy-makers. Scholars and analysts have pointed out that since Vietnam, the lack of a foreign policy consensus among the American public has made it extremely difficult for contemporary presidents to successfully govern and manage U.S. foreign policy during their tenures in office (see Destler, Lake & Gelb, 1984; Mann, 1990; Rosati, 1993; Smith, 1988). No matter what a president believes or desires, there are substantial segments of the American public, especially among the most attentive and active, that do not agree with an administration’s intended foreign policy direction and seek to obstruct it. This lack of support for a president tends to increase with time in office and gets expressed in Congress, the media, and throughout society by interest groups and social movements. In the years before Vietnam, the problem was that the president could lead, but only in the direction of a fervent anticommunism emphasizing the role of force; today, it is difficult for a president to generate leadership in any direction for a sustained period. This explains why no post-Vietnam president has been able to restore a consensus in thinking about U.S. foreign policy.

A key to understanding the breakdown of the Cold War consensus and the decline in the president’s ability to govern is the role played by beliefs of elites—that is, the small percentage of Americans who act as opinion leaders (Almond, 1960; Galtung, 1965; Neuman, 1986; Rosenau, 1961). According to Thomas Mann (1990, pp. 11–12), “The bipartisan foreign policy consensus that prevailed for almost two decades after World War II was sustained by a leadership stratum that shared an internationalist and interventionist view of the U.S. role in world affairs, an attentive and educated group of citizens who followed and supported this leadership, and a poorly informed and largely inert mass public that tolerated official policy as long as it appeared to be working.” It was ultimately the split in beliefs among members of the elite over the Vietnam War that generated the collapse of the Cold War consensus throughout American society.

Several facets of this historic split within the elite were brought to light by the work of Ole Holsti and James Rosenau. It was through their efforts to tap prevailing directions in American elite foreign policy beliefs after the Vietnam War that the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus into at least three and possibly four competing sets of beliefs was revealed, as was the reality that “perhaps the only constancy in American foreign policy since the Vietnam War has been the con-

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1 For a general discussion of the paradox of presidential power, see Burns, 1984; Hodgson, 1980; Lowi, 1985; Neustadt, 1991; and Pious, 1979.
spicious lack of constancy in its conduct" (Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, p. 1). Yet throughout their work, Holsti and Rosenau have also readily admitted that our understanding of the precise contours and cleavages in contemporary American elite attitudes toward foreign policy is limited. Distinguishing among groups of Americans to help illuminate both the nature of elite opinion in America and its substantive effects on foreign policy and policy-making continues to be an unfinished quest.

We build off the work of Holsti and Rosenau on the diversity of foreign policy thought. We believe Holsti and Rosenau identified the broad foreign policy perspectives which dominated among American elites in the 1980s and that these still form much of the basis for the foreign policy dissensus in America during the 1990s, despite the end of the Cold War. At the same time, we contend that their three- and four-headed categorizations de-emphasize important differences in beliefs and conceal at least two distinct foreign policy orientations among elites.

In pursuing our line of inquiry, the paper begins with a summary and evaluation of the Holsti and Rosenau analysis, offers content analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals as a means of identifying the major foreign policy orientations that prevailed during the Cold War of the 1980s, and assesses the impact that the end of the Cold War has had for change in beliefs in the 1990s. Our research suggests that by utilizing other data and combining them with the findings of previous elite research, we can begin to understand more fully the nature of the ongoing foreign policy debate among elites in America and its implications for the policy-making process.

**HOLSTI AND ROSENAU’S THREE- AND FOUR-HEADED EAGLES**

The totality of Holsti and Rosenau’s work over the last 15 years represents the first comprehensive, empirically based study of contemporary American foreign policy beliefs since the Vietnam War. Their principal findings have been broadly disseminated and are widely cited by scholars of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy and authors of foreign policy texts (see Holsti, 1979; Holsti & Rosenau, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1988b; Rosenau & Holsti, 1980, 1983). Much of their initial research was brought together in their book, *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus* (1984), where they examined the content and evolution of the foreign policy beliefs held by American leaders representing a “broad range of institutions—from government to churches, business to universities, labor to the media, and others”—based on two nationwide surveys conducted in 1976 and 1980 (Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, p. 21). Their research addressed three clusters of questions:

1. What has been the impact of the Vietnam War on America’s leaders?
2. If the impact has been dissensus, what are the main lines of cleavage?

3. Have the post-Vietnam beliefs been maintained or have they undergone change over time?

In analyzing their results, Holsti and Rosenau first found that the Vietnam War was a watershed event that shattered the post-World War II consensus in U.S. foreign policy. Second, they discovered that the Vietnam War produced three major cleavages, or schools of thought, in the foreign policy beliefs of America’s leaders: Cold War internationalism, post-Cold War internationalism, and semi-isolationism. They referred to this as the three-headed eagle. Third, they discovered on comparing their 1976 and 1980 leadership surveys, that the nature of schisms among elites was fairly stable across time. Finally, Holsti and Rosenau also found a close relationship between the three schools of thought and political ideology: those most conservative tended to be among the staunchest adherents of Cold War internationalism, while those most liberal tended to identify with post-Cold War internationalism, in particular, and semi-isolationism to a lesser extent.

With time, however, Holsti and Rosenau seemed aware that the trifold split was not the only way to categorize the foreign policy beliefs of leaders, and they gradually recognized signs of divisions among elites they labeled Cold War internationalists. The cleavage they suggested encompassed what they viewed as Cold War unilateralists, those who were willing to have the U.S. go it alone in its Cold War with the Soviet Union, and Cold War multilateralists, those who believed that containment was dependent on healthy alliances and international support. Holsti and Rosenau’s (1988a, 1990, 1993) more recent work has augmented and refined these observations about the nature of American elite attitudes on foreign policy.

Rather than continuing to rely primarily on their single internationalism-isolationism continuum to describe a three-headed eagle, the authors turned to a two-dimensional framework—militant internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI)—developed by Eugene Wittkopf (1986, 1987, 1990; Mag-

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2 In their discussion of the collapse of the foreign policy consensus, Holsti and Rosenau acknowledge that “whether or not there was foreign policy consensus in this country for about two decades after World War II is itself a point on which there is less than full agreement” (Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, p. 28). Although they do not directly test for the existence of a Cold War consensus, the data they do have suggest that the notion of a foreign policy consensus in which the vast majority of Americans shared a Cold War worldview and supported the general policy of containment may be overstated somewhat. For example, they found that only 51% of America’s leaders—a bare majority—favored the U.S. government’s official position for a military victory when the Vietnam War first became an issue during the height of the Cold War when the so-called foreign policy consensus prevailed; 22% favored a complete withdrawal and 22% fell in between the two extreme positions. Although consensus represented the majoritarian view, it should be noted that there were sizable minority segments of the society who were critical or unsupportive, from both the political left and the right, and that the consensus years were of shorter duration than commonly thought—majority support behind a policy of global containment did not coalesce until the early 50s and began to crumble by the mid-60s (see Goldman, 1960; Hodgson, 1973; Wittkopf, 1990).
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Wittkopf, these two dimensions produce four as opposed to three foreign policy types: hardliners who support MI and oppose CI; internationalists who support MI and CI; accommodationists who oppose MI and support CI; and isolationists who oppose MI and CI. Holsti and Rosenau examined this classification scheme through the use of their 1976, 1980, and more recent 1984 and 1988 elite surveys. Their findings strongly suggest that significant groups of elites do indeed fit the profiles of these four schools of thought. As with the three-headed eagle, they also found that correlations between the four types and ideology were strong. They conclude that, some doubts notwithstanding, the militant internationalism-cooperative internationalism basis for the four-headed eagle “provides an excellent starting point for further inquiries into public opinion on international affairs” (Holsti & Rosenau, 1990, p. 122).

HOW MUCH DIVERSITY IN ELITE BELIEFS?

Though the work of Holsti, Rosenau, and Wittkopf has moved the study of elite attitudes in U.S. foreign policy forward, others have continually asked whether their findings provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex nature of American elite diversity in foreign policy beliefs. A number of other scholars and analysts of U.S. foreign policy have suggested that the consensus breakdown has resulted in greater complexity and diversity in foreign policy beliefs among the public. For example, Jerald Combs (1983) in a historiographic survey of the literature on the Vietnam War identifies as many as six competing interpretations. Cecil Crabb (1976) identifies four internationalist-oriented and two isolationist-oriented foreign policy viewpoints as a result of his review of the foreign policy literature. William Chittick and Keith Billingsley (1989; and Travis, 1993) demonstrate the importance of three dimensions and the likelihood of four internationalist and four isolationist schools of thought derived from factor analyses of survey data. Even Holsti and Rosenau have acknowledged that their classifications might obscure subtle differences within each group and that “a critic might suggest that the fourfold classification scheme is too simple, or that it overemphasizes between-type differences while obscuring those among persons who are classified within any of the four cells” (Holsti & Rosenau, 1990, p. 120, author emphasis).

Part of the disagreement may center on the specific strategy of inquiry used in the various studies. For example, Holsti and Rosenau’s three-headed eagle was derived from “an impressionistic survey of recent foreign policy debates in this country” and a systematic examination of the 1976 and 1980 leadership surveys.

Although Holsti and Rosenau rely on Wittkopf’s two-dimensional scheme, we refer to Holsti and Rosenau’s work in this paper predominantly because Wittkopf’s research tends to focus on mass as opposed to elite beliefs. Wittkopf’s (1990) book, Faces of Internationalism, spends much more time examining elite beliefs and comparing them to mass beliefs than do his articles.
(Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, p. 108). But no analytic technique has been presented for inferring the three schools of thought, either from the impressionistic analysis or the leadership surveys—it is unclear what criteria was used to derive the three-headed eagle. As Charles Kegley (1986, p. 453) has asked in critiquing their early work,

Is the structure imposed on reality by the Holsti and Rosenau formulations realistic? Consider more closely the analytic procedures that Holsti and Rosenau used. On the basis of a priori reasoning, they group beliefs into three foreign affairs belief systems, and then, on the basis of “reduction,” present evidence to provide a basis for this grouping.4

“By delineating three postures toward world affairs, a priori,” Bardes and Oldendick (1990:240) likewise note that “other postures or non-postures are eliminated from consideration.”

A similar problem arises in their more recent work on the four-headed eagle. Holsti and Rosenau (1990, p. 120–121) make plain their preference to think in terms of dimensions for constructing classifications of foreign policy belief systems, primarily because of conceptual flexibility: two dimensions not only provide the foundation for a two-by-two matrix of four types, but it can easily be expanded to a three-by-three matrix producing nine types by making finer distinctions along each of the dimensions employed. This flexibility results in the “deductive” construction of ideal types of foreign policy schools of thought which are then imposed on the data to see if respondents fall into the respective categories. Wittkopf, for example, derives the two dimensions of military and cooperative internationalism through factor analysis of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations public opinion data, but his decision to juxtapose the two dimensions at their mid-points to yield a two-by-two matrix of four equal quadrants or cells—reflecting four comparable foreign policy orientations—was arbitrary.5 This reinforces Kegley’s (1986) point about the lack of criteria for determining real types of foreign policy belief systems (see also Chittick et al., 1993). Not surprisingly, Holsti and Rosenau were able to identify Wittkopf’s four schools of thought using the original 1976 and 1980 data sets (supplemented with more recent surveys). This leads one

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4 Holsti and Rosenau (1984, p. 108) acknowledge that they were influenced by a secondary analysis of the 1975 Chicago Council of Foreign Relations by William Schneider which “revealed the existence of three quite distinct ways of thinking about foreign affairs—conservative internationalism, liberal internationalism, and non-internationalism” (see Mandelbaum & Schneider, 1978; Schneider, 1983, 1984, 1987).

5 Wittkopf’s two dimensions have been open to criticism for lacking definition and being used inconsistently throughout his work (see Chittick, 1991; see also Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, on problems inherent in the use of factor analysis in the study of public opinion). It also should be pointed out that Holsti and Rosenau’s surveys lack flexibility, for their questions were originally devised with the three-headed eagle in mind. And if the survey questions do change to reflect the changes in the classification scheme, the ability to assess continuity and change in foreign policy beliefs over time may be compromised.
to ask the question, If the same data analyzed by Holsti and Rosenau supported the existence of a four-headed eagle as well as a three-headed eagle, might it also support a five-headed eagle or more? As Kegley (1986:453) states, “Might we find only that for which we look?”

Even an impressionistic analysis of Holsti and Rosenau’s post-Cold War internationalists—Wittkopf’s accommodationists—indicates the need to think in terms of greater diversity of foreign policy thought. Holsti and Rosenau (1984, Chapter 4), for example, discuss Stanley Hoffmann and Seyom Brown alongside Richard Falk and Walter LaFeber in illustrating the common characteristics of that school of thought. In one sense, their views do overlap—all were critical of Cold War internationalism in the 1980s. However, their policy recommendations have never had much in common: Hoffmann and Brown have wanted to reform U.S. foreign policy; Falk and LaFeber are continually supportive of more radical change. These significant differences in policy recommendations are indicative of differing foreign policy views of the world that Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf) do not tap.

**RESEARCH STRATEGY**

In this study we rely on a content analysis of foreign policy journals and national journals of American opinion as the basis for capturing the diversity and complexity of public beliefs in U.S. foreign policy. In his review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, Kegley (1986, p. 467) recommends that “future research might consider severing its almost exclusive reliance on survey research methodologies and instead estimate the distribution of opinion by tapping other indicators.” He specifically suggests the use of “content analysis of the foreign policy debates of policymakers and intellectuals, as carried out in the leading policy journals.” Kegley points out that

It was on those pages that the positions that ultimately came to be identified with the “postwar consensus” and the “Vietnam consensus” first were given expression and later crystallized into a more-or-less coherent set of axioms. Likewise, American leaders appear—from the heated discussions presently unfolding in policy journals—to be at the

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6 Many of these problems posed above may also be a function of how the survey research was conducted. Clearly, survey research is a valuable instrument in the study of public opinion for indicating the general attitudes held by large publics. However, typical surveys have major limitations for determining different “types” of shared belief systems among respondents. First, questions within surveys are not typically designed to determine the range of beliefs that exist among the same respondents. Second, most respondents in survey samples tend to be drawn from the mainstream of American society, thus camouflaging more diverse views held by segments of the public. Finally, and most importantly, surveys deal with large aggregates and are unable to discriminate among separate belief systems. In other words, the “disaggregative” process poses a validity problem for identifying separate belief systems representative of different segments of the elite needs to be directly addressed.
incipient stage of another “great debate” about the axioms that should animate subsequent American foreign policy as the nature of American interests and objectives are, for the first time in a generation, again receiving fundamental reassessment. (see also Barnet, 1981, and Tucker, 1981, for similar arguments)

It is in foreign policy journals, such as *Foreign Policy* and *The National Interest*, and national opinion journals, like *Commentary* and *The New Republic*, where the debate on the nature and direction of American foreign policy is played out. These journals are excellent sources for tapping into elite opinion for a number of reasons. First, they are major outlets that American opinion leaders—practitioners, policy analysts, journalists, scholars, intellectuals, and the like—rely on to communicate their point of view (see Rosenau, 1961). Second, they are the most common sources of information beyond the popular media (that is television, the newspaper, and maybe a newsweekly) to which the most politically attentive and active members of the elite are likely to turn (see Weiss, 1974; Zaller, 1992). Third, content analysis of the media, including national journals of opinion, is widely used for studying elite attitudes in such fields as comparative politics, sociology, and the study of communications.

In order to be sensitive to the relationship between ideology and foreign policy views found by Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf), we selected a set of journals that spanned the political spectrum. This resulted in identifying five foreign policy (quarterly) journals: *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Global Affairs, The National Interest, and World Policy Journal*. Likewise, eight national opinion (weekly to monthly) journals were selected: *American Opinion, Commentary, Dissent, Monthly Review, The Nation, The National Review, The New Republic, and The Progressive*. As described by Katz and Katz (1986), these opinion journals are the most popular nationally with the largest circulation rates and represent the breadth of the ideological spectrum in American society. Not only does each set of journals represent an ideological cross-section but comparing their contents provides an important check of validity when determining the prevailing foreign policy views among elites.

The content analysis was conducted on all articles in each of the journals for a 10-year period, from 1980–1989, which dealt with general interpretations of U.S. foreign policy—America-and-the-world type pieces. For the national opinion journals, more than 800 authored articles and staff editorials were examined; book review articles, however, were not included. For the foreign policy journals, more than 130 articles were analyzed.

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7 Other national opinion journals (*Conservative Digest, Mother Jones, Washington Monthly*) were not included for they did not regularly include articles on U.S. foreign policy. Newsweeklies (*Newsweek, Time, U.S. News and World Report*) were not included given their focus on presenting “news” as opposed to “opinion” (and the difficulty this would pose in inferring foreign policy beliefs), as well as their limited number and range across the ideological spectrum. For an overview of media sources, in addition to Katz and Katz (1986), see Wanniski (1992).
As part of the content analysis, we categorized elites based on the subjects' own thoughts and themes as they tried to make sense of the world around them. This was accomplished not by deducing three or four types and analyzing the data to see if they fit, but by determining the views of individuals as they were expressed in the articles and identifying observable patterns across the articles in the beliefs expressed. In other words, we engaged in an "aggregative" process of grouping the separate responses derived from the content analysis for each article into different schools of thought. Thus, the foreign policy orientations we derive are based on the content and tenor of the foreign policy debate as expressed among elites themselves.

We relied on five key questions about U.S. foreign policy, each representing a substantive dimension or aspect as the basis for the content analysis for generating individual foreign policy views and major foreign policy schools of thought. The five questions addressed were:

1. The structure of the international system? (Assessed on a unipolar to bipolar to multipolar continuum)
2. The major international actors? (Assessed in terms of their level of power—for example, hegemonic power, great power, regional power—and whether they pose threats or opportunities for the U.S.)
3. The major foreign policy issues? (Assessed in terms of the type of issue—for example, security issues, economic issues—and whether they pose threats or opportunities for the U.S.)
4. Lessons of history, such as World War II and Vietnam? (Assessed in terms of their positive or negative implications for the U.S.)
5. Policy recommendations? (Assessed in terms of their goals—for example, democracy, order, economic justice—and strategy—rollback, containment, multilateralism, strategic disengagement)

Why these five questions? As Kegley (1986) suggested, as noted above, these are the major questions around which the foreign policy debate revolves, hence providing the foundation for determining the diversity and complexity of elite beliefs in U.S. foreign policy. Most of the studies of public opinion in U.S. foreign policy have tended to revolve around the fifth question concerning policy recommendations (e.g., militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, multilateralism-unilateralism). However, policy recommendations flow from, and are usually consistent with, how the world is viewed (in terms of structure, actors, issues, and lessons—the first four questions; see, e.g., George & Keohane, 1980, p. 231–232). Not only does this more fully reflect the foreign policy debate that has been raging over the years, it is consistent with the development over the last two decades of a vast literature on social cognition and schema theory that indicates that the belief systems of individuals and publics, especially those most attentive and informed...
(in other words, those most “expert”), tend to be quite complex (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Milburn 1991; Rosati, 1995).8

These questions, in fact, are grounded in the theoretical and empirical literature in international relations, especially in the study of U.S. foreign policy and the beliefs of political leaders. For example, the significance of images of the structure of the international system (question 1) and the relative importance of various issues (question 3) have been highlighted within the Brecher decision-making framework (Brecher, Steinberg, & Stein, 1969), Keohane and Nye’s (1977) and Mansbach and Vasquez’s (1981) international systems approach, Rosati’s (1987) political psychological study of the Carter administration’s worldview, and Yergin’s (1978) historical analysis of the origins of the Cold War. Images of international actors and threat perceptions (question 2) as well as lessons of history (question 4) have been well documented in such works as Holsti’s (1967) study of John Foster Dulles’s “inherent bad faith” image of the Soviet Union, Jervis’s (1976) study of perceptions and misperceptions, and May’s (1973) lessons of the past. Finally, a focus on the goals and strategy of policy (question 5) has received considerable attention in the vast literature on American diplomatic history as well as more systematic foreign policy studies, such as the operational code approach, which sees the “instrumental” beliefs of political leaders flowing from their larger “philosophical” beliefs (see George, 1969; Walker, 1977).

Answers to these five questions provide the foundation for determining the complexity and diversity of foreign policy thought among the elite. Basically, three steps were followed throughout the content analysis process. First, each of the journals was perused by the two authors in order to identify relevant “America and the world” type articles. Second, each of the relevant articles were read and analyzed to determine individual foreign policy orientations in terms of the five questions discussed above. The focus was on the major themes communicated within each article by the author relative to the questions. Appendix A provides an illustration. Naturally, some of the articles were more comprehensive and explicit than others in providing answers to the five questions. In order to ensure the reliability of the content analysis, two coders randomly selected 20 articles from the foreign policy journals, coding for each of the five questions. Intercoder

8 A growing public opinion literature, in fact, indicates that the structure of foreign policy beliefs, among the mass public no less, tends to be based on multiple dimensions (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Chittick & Billingsley, 1989; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987). Bardes and Oldendick (1990, p. 229), in their review of the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, point out that “with no agreed-upon structure for foreign policy issues, researchers must decide what assumptions will guide their investigation of attitudes.” Yet, as pointed out by William Chittick (1991, p. 1498), the major problem with much of the public opinion literature “lies in the fact that these studies are data-driven, rather than rooted in some concept of the basic questions of foreign policy.” This topic about how one lays the foundation for generating different types of belief systems is quite significant and deserves much more thought and attention.
agreement was 93.5%, indicating a high degree of reliability in the data analysis process. Finally, consistent patterns across respondents, in terms of similarities and differences, were compared for clustering and identifying different foreign policy orientations or schools of thought. Ultimately, we relied both upon a quantitative and qualitative content analysis. As suggested by Alexander George (1959, p. 7), qualitative analysis of communications "often yield better clues to the particular intentions of a particular speaker at one moment in time than more standardized quantitative methods" (see Krippendorff, 1980; Larson, 1985, 1987; Rosati, 1987).9

FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS IN THE EIGHTIES

General Findings and Assessment

Rather than a three- or four-headed eagle, we discovered six major foreign policy orientations among American elites from our analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals (see Table I). Although Kegley (1986, p. 455) has pointed out the pitfalls of labeling "empirically determined schools-of-thought," we selected labels which, however imperfect, reflected each of the six schools' general worldview and policy orientation in response to the five questions that formed the basis of the content analysis:

1. Global crusaders
2. Global containers
3. Selective containers
4. Global reformers
5. Global transformers

A number of generalizations are immediately obvious when comparing our findings to those of Holsti and Rosenau. First, what we found reinforces the general conclusions of Holsti and Rosenau—there are multiple general foreign policy orientations that prevailed among American elites. Second, we also found that there

9 It is important to point out that Holsti and Rosenau's (1984, p. 108) three-headed eagle was originally generated from "an impressionist survey of recent foreign policy debates in this country," which then was confirmed by the systematic examination of survey-research-generated data. This study's reliance on a content analysis, although more systematic, remains common practice among those who study the foreign policy beliefs of political leaders (see Herrmann, 1985; Holsti, 1976; Larson, 1985, 1987; Rosati, 1987; Walker, 1977). Our qualitative content analysis, in fact, is not dissimilar from the method of "structured focus comparison" developed by Alexander George (see George & Smoke, 1974, Chapter 4) or current popular research approaches that have arisen in a "post-positivist era" that go by other names, such as discourse analysis (see Lapid, 1989; Shapiro, Bonham & Heradstveit, 1988).
is a greater diversity of foreign policy thought than what can be captured by three or four schools of thought, which reaffirms the work of others as discussed above (see, e.g., Chittick & Billingsley, 1989; Combs, 1983; Crabb, 1976). On the one hand, there appears to be considerable overlap between the (three and four) schools of thought found by Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf) with four of our six schools of thought (see Table II). However, exactly how much overlap exists remains

**TABLE I. Presence of Foreign Policy Orientations in Foreign Policy and National Opinion Journals—1980s**

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<th>GCo</th>
<th>SCo</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The New Republic</em></td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dissent</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Progressive</em></td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Monthly Review</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Frequency distribution is in terms of number of articles.

- GCr = Global Crusader
- GCo = Global Container
- SCo = Selective Container
- GRe = Global Reformer
- GTr = Global Transformer
- SEn = Selective Engager

**TABLE II. Similarities and Differences in Foreign Policy Orientations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holsti &amp; Rosenau’s Three-Headed Eagle</th>
<th>Wittkopf’s Four-Headed Eagle</th>
<th>Rosati &amp; Creed’s Six-Headed Eagle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War Internationalists</td>
<td>Hardliners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internationalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War Internationalists</td>
<td>Accommodationists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Isolationists</td>
<td>Isolationists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
unclear because Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf) have not spent much time
describing or developing the content of each school of thought that comprises their
four-headed eagle. On the other hand, we found two foreign policy views—selective containers and global transformers—that are not captured by any of their
classification schemes but which our content analysis clearly indicates merit separate consideration.

Third, we found that their three-headed eagle, in particular, captures the
"broad" foreign policy perspectives that prevailed among elites, even though they
downplay important distinctions within each perspective and miss important internal belief system characteristics—not just subtle nuances—that need to be recognized to better capture the complexity of the foreign policy beliefs of American elites. In other words, the additional foreign policy orientations we isolated did not really fall outside of their original threefold classification but represented important differences that fell within the original three-headed eagle—suggesting greater belief system complexity. With respect to their Cold War internationalists, three different variants or views were identified. Likewise, post-Cold War internationalists consisted of elites who operated from two divergent orientations. Our findings also suggest that the semi-isolationists comprise different variants, although our data were insufficient for precisely identifying what those particular views might be.

Finally, consistent with Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf), we substantiate that foreign policy orientations and political ideology are closely related. This is an important finding that contradicts most studies which have been able to uncover a relationship between ideology and public attitudes only for more domestic-oriented policy issues (see Bardes & Oldendick, 1990; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Milburn, 1991; Oskamp, 1977; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). This study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between different types, or strata, of publics in order to better understand the diversity and complexity of cognitive thinking throughout the public (see Galtung, 1965; Key, 1961; Neuman, 1986; Rosenau, 1961).

As Table III reveals, there is a direct correspondence between five of the foreign policy orientations among the elite and the ideological orientation of both the foreign policy journals and national opinion journals. As one moves from global crusaders to global transformers, one moves from the political right to the political left. Three of the orientations—global crusaders, global containers, and selective containers—regularly appeared in the foreign policy and opinion journals that are associated with the conservative right of the political spectrum. Two of the orientations—global reformers and global transformers—appeared in the more liberal-left foreign policy and opinion journals. The major exception was the selective engagers, who consisted of a greater ideological hodgepodge, appearing not only in the liberal Foreign Policy and The Progressive, but the neoconservative and neoliberal The National Interest and The New Republic as well. This correspondence between a particular foreign policy orientation and ideology was not
simply a function of articles published in one opinion journal: global reformers
were found regularly in four national opinion journals, global containers and global
transformers were found in three national opinion journals, and global crusaders,
selective containers, and selective engagers were each in two different national
opinion journals (a similar pattern found with the foreign policy journals, keeping
in mind that they are fewer in number and somewhat narrower in ideological range).
Therefore, at least among elite attitudes, ideology and foreign policy orientations
are strong bedfellows (see also Schneider, 1979; Schneider, 1974–1975; 1984).

The six foreign policy orientations we found are historically significant for
making sense of the complex politics of United States foreign policy. What follows
is a thumbnail sketch of each of these schools, indicating the journal sources and
representative individuals and articles, in light of the initial categorization scheme
presented by Holsti and Rosenau to enhance clarity. The descriptions will provide
a fuller understanding of each orientation, which is important since belief content
usually has not received much attention in the past.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE III. Presence of Foreign Policy Orientations In Journals Arranged by Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Journals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Policy Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Opinion Journals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Left)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: + indicates at least two articles from a particular foreign policy orientation

GCr = Global Crusader
GCo = Global Container
SCo = Selective Container
GRe = Global Reformer
GTr = Global Transformer
SEn = Selective Engager
The Three-Headed Cold War Internationalists

According to Holsti and Rosenau’s (1984, p. 109) scheme, Cold War internationalists were people who in the 1970s and 1980s saw “a conflict-ridden world in which the primary cleavages are those dividing the United States and its allies from the Soviet empire and in which most, if not all, of the most salient issues and conflicts are closely linked to each other and that fault line.” According to Cold War internationalists, the Soviet Union was an ambitious, aggressive, expansionist power leading a strong and patient cohort of allies toward revolutionary aims: imposing an imperial system under Moscow’s domination on the state system that has existed since 1945. The U.S., on the other hand, was the principal defender and leader of the free world. Thus, individuals adhering to this school had a zero-sum view of the world in which a victory for one is a loss for the other. What Holsti and Rosenau failed to see, however, was that their Cold War internationalist school of thought consists of three different groups—global containers, global crusaders, and selective containers—who, while sharing the very broad conception of the world outlined above, nonetheless differed with one another on a number of important points (Table IV provides a summary of each of the three perspectives).

Global Containers. The group which embraced the majority of Cold War internationalist traits through the 1980s as Holsti and Rosenau described them might be called global containers. The global container school of thought was found primarily in the work of authors who published in three foreign policy journals—Global Affairs, The National Interest, and Foreign Affairs—and three national opinion journals: Commentary and The National Review, and to a lesser extent The New Republic. Authors like Norman Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, Richard Pipes, and Paul Nitze, whose works were integral to Holsti and Rosenau’s Cold War internationalist perspective, were among our global containers. This school shares much in common with Wittkopf’s “internationalist” school of thought, but the latter is not well-defined.

Throughout most of the 1980s, global containers saw the world in bipolar, zero-sum terms, focusing on the protracted ideological and strategic conflicts between the democratic and communist systems as embraced by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. respectively. Discussions of international economics and other “low politics” rarely appeared until the advent of perestroika in the Soviet Union and were, nevertheless, subsumed within the East-West framework. Indeed, the significance of other nation-states was almost exclusively regarded within the context of the ideological and strategic struggles of the Cold War. What few parts of the world stood outside the superpower rivalry in the decade were of little concern.

During the early years of the Cold War, global containers believed America’s containment policy produced many successful outcomes, from the post-World War II restoration of Western Europe to the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and had allowed America to forge ahead of the Soviets in the struggle for global influence and respect (see Menges, 1988). But the U.S. experience in Vietnam
constituted a classic turning point in its foreign policy. Containers believed America’s mission in Vietnam was predicated on just motives and that Americans wrongly called into question their own democratic, free enterprise values as the war evolved and gradually lost the resolve needed to accomplish the desired ends (see Roche, 1985; Berger, 1980). The resulting “Vietnam syndrome” prevented America from sufficiently modernizing its military forces and supporting Third World allies under renewed pressure from Soviet-backed Marxist forces. Gradually, American neglect—some would say appeasement—resulted in the balance of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE IV. Cold War Internationalist Orientations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Depiction of the International System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.—benevolent, defender of freedom, lacks will, militarily deficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.—imperial, communist, totalitarian, militarily stronger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Lessons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescription</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
military power shifting markedly toward the Soviet Union, leaving America and
the world’s democracies vulnerable to a host of potential Soviet threats.

Going into the 1980s, adherents of this orientation tended to be gloomy, even
apocalyptic, as they contemplated America’s unwillingness to maintain a favorable
balance of power relative to the Soviet Union and to confront Soviet expansion
resolutely. In response, they argued that America needed to return to the tenets
which guided American foreign policy through the 1950s and 1960s, advocating a
policy of global containment and a generous growth in American defense spending
(see Podhoretz, 1980; Rostow, 1986). Often too, these recommendations were
coupled with a call to promote freedom by extending material support to
anticommunist movements and governments, particularly in Central America,
to roll back communism at the edges (see Krauthammer, 1986). Moreover,
American leaders had to guard against another loss of resolve, which would
inevitably result in reaching flawed agreements with U.S. adversaries and
endanger the prospects of freedom and democracy around the world (see

Global Crusaders. Concern over the prospects for freedom and democracy
also worried other American elites—global crusaders—who fell partly beyond the
boundaries of Holsti and Rosenau’s studies. The global crusader orientation shared
some elements of Holsti and Rosenau’s fourth school, the Cold War unilateralists,
and Wittkopf’s hardliners, though portions of this view lay outside the boundaries
of their studies. The global crusader orientation was developed from the most
conservative journals, primarily in the work of authors who appeared in American
Opinion, as well as some authors who occasionally published in The National
Review and Commentary as well as the foreign policy journal Global Affairs.
Prominent global crusaders included individuals as diverse as Pat Buchanan and
Pat Robertson.

While global crusaders shared the basic global container view of an East-West
world, they believed even more fervently that the struggle of the past decade was
solely between forces of communist totalitarianism and forces of democratic
freedom. In addition, while the global containers contended that the U.S. began to
lose ground to communism in the aftermath of Vietnam, global crusaders believed
that most of post-World War II history had the same lesson to teach: American
leaders consistently failed to respond effectively to communist expansion. As a
result of this perpetual American weakness, communism enjoyed a level of world
influence that far surpassed the forces of freedom even into the late 1980s. Some
crusaders, in fact, contended that most of the world’s countries were heavily
affected by communist elements and many were thoroughly dominated by com-
munism (see “Scorecard,” 1984).

Nor could the root of this American failure be found simply in a lack of resolve
or poor analysis on the part of U.S. leaders, as global containers have suggested.
Instead, America’s failure stemmed from serious weaknesses and flaws within
American government and society. Some crusaders contended that “liberal” influ-
ence in American politics unduly distorted and misdirected American post-World War II foreign policy (see Buchanan, 1984). The most ardent crusaders went further and attributed failure to a conspiracy from within American society, for they believed communism to be a parasitic system that could survive only with the witting or unwitting help of Western money and tolerance (see Stang, 1982; Kirkwood, 1988).

Prior to such a pervasive threat, global crusaders would have sought solace in an isolationist approach to world politics, safe in the knowledge that the world’s evils would bankrupt themselves while America survived and prospered. However, given the inroads made by communism throughout the world and even within America itself following World War II, these predispositions gave way to a very aggressive worldwide foreign policy posture of “rolling back” communism, a position that went far beyond spending more for defense and containing the Soviet Union (see Hoar, 1981; Stang, 1982). America had to openly and aggressively serve notice to communism that it was ready, unilaterally if necessary, to wage an ideological, economic, and if need be, military struggle to free the world’s captive peoples and export the fruits of America’s freedom and democracy.

Selective Containers. Although the vast majority of Cold War internationalist adherents expressed dissatisfaction with the perceived decline of America’s position in the global hierarchy, selective containers—a third orientation ignored within Holsti and Rosenau’s broad categorization—saw that this decline was not rooted in the threat of communist ideology but in the tangible capabilities of the superpowers and the impact these capacities had on the global balance of power. The selective container school of thought appeared to be subsumed within Holsti and Rosenau’s Cold War internationalists and Wittkopf’s internationalists, even though its worldview was distinct and deserves separate treatment. The selective container view was found in the work of authors who published primarily in the national opinion journals Commentary and The New Republic, as well as the foreign policy journals Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and Foreign Policy. Selective containers included such analysts as Walter Laqueur and Robert Tucker.

Selective containers tended to operate within a strict “realpolitik” tradition and started from the premise that each superpower would act in accordance with its own perceived self-interest rather than on strictly ideological grounds. Not surprisingly, then, their analysis concentrated less on the dangers posed by a Soviet quest for world revolution and more on the threat of a powerful Russia, largely unfettered by domestic constraints, seeking to expand its influence until it confronted determined opposition. When the Soviets encountered less resistance from America and the West in the 1960s and 1970s, the balance of power gradually shifted in Moscow’s favor (see Laqueur, 1980b).

As their label suggests, selective containers most notably break with their Cold War internationalist cousins on policy recommendations, for they did not regard containing and rolling back communism around the globe as desirable or effective strategies to meet America’s interests. Times had changed, especially when one
reevaluated America’s economy, the strength of alliance commitments, and domestic patience for such a worldwide strategy. The U.S. of the late 20th century had to carefully prioritize its foreign policy goals, something it could safely do given that parts of the world remained insignificant enough to “stew in their own juices” (Laqueur, 1980a, p. 40). Indeed, America made its most egregious foreign policy errors when it lifted a peripheral nation—like Vietnam—or a secondary issue—like the Palestinian crisis—to the status of a core interest and then acted on it (see Tucker, 1982; Gaddis, 1983–1984).

Nonetheless, if order, stability, and the balance of power were to be preserved in the face of dangerous adversaries like the U.S.S.R., limited policies of containment had to be pursued in sectors of the world vital to American interests. Different adherents of this orientation identified different areas of vital interest to the United States—such as Western Europe, the Middle East, or Central America. Force remained an important instrument of policy, but only if it was needed to safeguard the national interest. Moreover, many selective containers believed America must make more effective use of other tools of foreign policy, such as diplomacy, covert operations, economic resources and trade, and cultural and propaganda programs (see Laqueur, 1982).

Consistent with the broad Cold War internationalist perspective, selective containers warned that limited containment should not be equated with detente or be regarded as a strategy driven to ultimately enhance relations with adversaries, such as the Soviet Union. Rather, the policy should be viewed as “a coexistence free of illusions, based on an awareness of common as well as opposed interests” (Laqueur, 1983, p. 586). Given the nature of power politics rivalries, the emphasis had to remain on flexible strategies which protected one’s national security and vital interests while maintaining order and stability.

The Two-Headed Post-Cold War Internationalists

While each of the three previous foreign policy orientations tended to see a relatively uncluttered world in terms of actors and significant forces affecting events, the perspective of Holsti and Rosenau’s post-Cold War internationalists was a good deal more cluttered and complex. The important conflicts to post-Cold War internationalists could not all easily be captured beneath the banner of the East-West military and power balance. Global interdependence, world economic conditions, levels of development and underdevelopment, and people’s desire for self-determination—all factors which only peripherally entered the discussions of those in the aforementioned schools—occupied center stage along with ideologies, power, and military balance in the post-Cold War internationalist world. With the passing of time, too, adherents of this perspective believed that non-military issues would increase in relative importance as the pressure to meet basic human needs mounted. The post-Cold War internationalist world was multidimensional and
often positive sum—a gain for one may be a gain, not a loss, for another. Yet, as
was the case with the Cold War internationalists, Holsti and Rosenau’s post-Cold
War internationalist perspective snared multiple clusters of people with two distinct
orientations we have called global reformers and global transformers (Table V
provides a summary of each of these two perspectives).

**Global Reformers.** Global reformers bear direct resemblance to Holsti and
Rosenau’s post-Cold War internationalists. The global reformer orientation also
appears to bear some resemblance to Wittkopf’s “accommodationists” school of
thought. The global reformer perspective was developed from authors who pub-
lished in the following national opinion journals: The New Republic, The Nation,
Dissent, and The Progressive. Such a view was also prevalent in the foreign policy

<p>| TABLE V. Post-Cold War Internationalists and Semi-Isolationist Orientations |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Depiction of the International System</th>
<th>Global Reformers</th>
<th>Global Transformers</th>
<th>Semi-Isolationists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Actors</td>
<td>Multipolar, interdependent</td>
<td>Multipolar, with U.S. prevalent</td>
<td>Generally multipolar, interdependent, chaotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.—great power, in decline</td>
<td>U.S.—hegemonic power, in decline</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multitude of potentially important actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.—strong military power, economically weak, opportunistic</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.—strong military power, largely weak and defensive in nature</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.—increasingly overcommitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe + Japan—growing economic powers</td>
<td>Third World actors—often oppressed but offer hope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs—growing economic force</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Issues</td>
<td>Superpower relations and arms race, regional conflicts, global economic stability, third world development</td>
<td>Arms race, global expansionism, regional conflict, self determination, global inequality</td>
<td>Arms race and other transnational problems, domestic issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Lessons</td>
<td>Vietnam—example of decline in the utility of force</td>
<td>Vietnam—example of U.S. expansionism</td>
<td>Vietnam—U.S. global policy prone to failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescription</td>
<td>Maintain global order and stability, infuse justice, multilateralism</td>
<td>Restructure U.S. and international institutions to provide justice and dignity to world’s people</td>
<td>Limited U.S. involvement in world affairs, only when vital interests at stake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
journals *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *World Policy Journal*. Individuals who shared a global reformer orientation included Richard Barnet, Stanley Hoffmann, and Jerry Sanders.

Whereas once the U.S. and Soviet Union may have dominated world affairs, global reformers believed that more recently Japan, Western Europe, and the Third World attained the ability to conduct independent foreign policies and America had to factor these unique interests and desires into its own foreign policy agenda. In doing so, adherents of this school tended to identify two significant arenas of activity: the zero-sum diplomatic and strategic arena where power was the main currency and relatively few powers play the game; and the positive-sum economic arena which included trade, finance, energy, and environmental concerns and where all actors (including regional organizations and multinational corporations) had an active interest in the prosperity of the system (see Sanders & Schwenninger, 1986–1987; Klare, 1988; Hoffmann, 1989).

With this different conception of the international system came a distinctive view on the superpower rivalry. While the three orientations described above were rooted in notions of a prevailing Soviet strategic military advantage in recent times, global reformers insisted that a situation of relative parity had existed between the two for some time and that both countries could call upon fewer relative capabilities in the 1980s than in the 1950s and 1960s as military and economic power continued to diffuse throughout the world. The result was that neither the Soviets nor the Americans had the ability to dictate the terms of global order and stability any longer, nor were they likely to regain that power in the future (see Judis, 1981). Although the U.S.S.R. remained a threat to expand and thus a principal American adversary, areas of cooperation were possible and should be pursued, particularly nuclear arms control, weapons proliferation, and the environment (Brand, 1980; Nye, 1986; Cohen, 1988). Moreover, U.S. Cold War policies in the Third World were severely criticized for their failure to promote democracy and justice and their penchant for providing U.S. adversaries repeated opportunities to exploit the processes of change (see Barnet, 1982, 1984; Sanders & Schwenninger, 1986–1987).

Overall, global reformers criticized America’s inability throughout the 1980s to craft an appropriate response to a world of weakened superpowers and regional balances of power at the strategic level coupled with increased economic interdependence (see Steel, 1981a, 1981b; Mead, 1988–1989, 1989; Wrong, 1989). Reformers emphasized that justice as well as stability and order ought to be the goals of American foreign policy. In addition, they paid considerable attention to the importance of managing the international political economy with other industrialized nations and promoting economic growth and development, both abroad and at home (Bergsten, 1987; Calleo, Cleveland & Silk, 1988). These directions would not result in a radically different world structurally, however, nor would they eliminate the hard choices that perpetually faced America when it came to dealing with the world’s complexity and its authoritarian regimes. It could, in fact, mean
that America would have to resign itself to dealing occasionally with reprehensible regimes and temporarily endure situations that were an affront to human justice, for the pursuit of justice should not come at the wholesale expense of order and stability (see Pachter, 1980).

**Global Transformers.** The other orientation subsumed within Holsti and Rosenau’s post-Cold War internationalists—the global transformer view—was not readily captured by their classification scheme. The global transformer school of thought was derived from the works of authors who published in the *Monthly Review*, as well as *The Progressive* and *The Nation*. In addition to national opinion journals, such an orientation occasionally appeared in *World Policy Journal*. Global transformers included Noam Chomsky, Richard Falk, and Paul Sweezy.

Global transformers generally shared the reformers’ broad conception of a positive-sum, increasingly multipolar world, and recognized the relative importance of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. coupled with the gradual rise of Western Europe, Japan, China, and many nations in the Third World. But while they acknowledged the historical importance of the competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., they viewed America as the most preeminent and expansionist power throughout the Cold War period, both politically and economically. Indeed, the system of military alliances constructed by the U.S. against the U.S.S.R. since 1945 had been designed to ensure the maintenance and growth of American power throughout the world (see Falk, 1983). Some transformers went further, arguing that the United States sought to develop and maintain a global empire which would be subordinated to the needs of the American capitalist economy (see Petras, 1980; Chomsky, 1985). Throughout this period, on the other hand, the Soviets did not behave as the preeminent expansionist power, as all the previous orientations suggested in differing fashions, but rather as a cautious power whose global capabilities often were vastly exaggerated by the United States and which sought to catch up militarily with the U.S. (see Lasch, 1980; Lens, 1980; “Questions,” 1986).

Global transformers agreed with global reformers that since the early 1970s American leaders failed to recognize the extent to which the world had changed, especially the degree that American global dominance had slowly waned. However, structural flaws in the American capitalist economy, the exposed immorality of American interventionist diplomacy embodied in the Vietnam War, and the unwillingness of American citizens to support the wars necessary to defend imperial interests were key to any explanation of American decline (see Falk, 1984; Sweezy, 1989). As such, any attempts to promote stability, order, and a gradual infusion of justice into world politics were regarded by transformers as a cover for attempting to maintain American hegemony. Instead, they emphasized structural changes which enshrined a radical commitment to cooperation, peace, and economic democracy. Some saw structural change coming with the creation of a strong network of truly socialist economies which would gradually replace global capitalism (see Sweezy, 1989). Others focused on moving to create more global structures and opportunities for local autonomy and grassroots governing (see Solo,
1989). Active American participation in efforts to remake the crumbling global economic system and eliminate the exploitation of the world’s poor were vital (see Magdoff, 1982, 1986). So were resistance to any temptation by American leaders to compromise with authoritarian regimes for the sake of stability and putting an end to the U.S. ideology of empire (see Williams, 1980; Burbach, 1984). Despite the optimistic basis for their preferred world, global transformers tended to be pessimistic that the existing power structures would permit such sweeping change to occur. Without greater initiative from the world’s people and the invention of new forms of social interaction and democracy, transformation was not likely in the international political economy anytime soon.

Semi-Isolationists—America’s Selective Engagers

Like Holsti and Rosenau, we also found a school of thought which they referred to as semi-isolationists—those who envisioned a much more limited role for the U.S. in global affairs and believed that “if the United States is to have a salutary influence on the rest of the world, it will come about largely through a demonstrated ability to solve its own pressing domestic problems” (Holsti & Rosenau, 1984, p. 127). This view is consistent with Wittkopf’s isolationists. The selective engager orientation was found in the works of authors who published occasionally in Foreign Policy and two opinion journals, The New Republic and The Nation. Individuals such as Ted Carpenter, George Kennan (after Vietnam), Earl Ravenal, and Alan Tonelson argued in favor of selective engagement. Because the few elites who hold these views tended to publish in journals outside the purview of this study, articles by George Kennan, Earl Ravenal, and others known for their semi-isolationist ideas were consulted to augment this discussion (see Table V for an overview of the selective engager perspective).

In general, selective engagers saw a very complex, conflict-ridden world in the 1980s, with the Americans and Soviets sharing a propensity for expanding their spheres of influence atop an extremely unstable and rapidly changing world. Throughout the decade, even the greatest of powers repeatedly confronted the reality that exerting military and economic pressure failed utterly to persuade smaller, less powerful nations to alter their behavior. With time, selective engagers believed that all nations would find it increasingly more difficult to manage their relations with other countries because of this shared lack of compelling power (see Ravenal, 1980). Accordingly, selective engagers contended that America should respond to this trend by defining its “national interest” far more modestly. Only a few truly significant issues which directly affect U.S. well-being, like averting a global nuclear holocaust, maintaining international trade, or preventing the degradation of the world’s environment, merited America’s international attention.

Selective engagers also openly disputed the contention expressed by many of the preceding schools that it was America’s responsibility to spread its values across the globe (see Kennan, 1985–1986). Once interests finally had been defined,
disengagement and decoupling became the watchwords of the selective engagers; a policy of nonintervention or selective engagement would be followed wherever nonvital American interests were at stake. Indeed, the label “selective engager” is most appropriate since there was little of the past American isolationist fervor in their recommendations and justifications. Instead, they envisioned a much tougher litmus test for American relations with other nations—particularly in the political-military realm—rather than any comprehensive withdrawal from the workings of the world.

As a group, selective engagers have shown signs of gravitating to this foreign policy orientation from others in the 1970s and 1980s. George Kennan, for example, was an early convert, moving from a selective containment orientation (Kennan, 1977, 1985–1986). More movement was evident late in the late 1980s with the emergence of a variation of selective engagement that emphasized a more traditional “fortress America” orientation based on confidence in America’s global stature rather than the usual sense of foreboding (Tonelson, 1985–1986, 1989). America’s geographic isolation, robust nuclear arsenal, and largely self-sufficient economy could safely ward off what dangers the world might still pose and provide the resources for Americans to deal with deepening domestic ills.

Although selective engagers are classified as one general foreign policy orientation, it is important to understand that they entertain a variety of diverse and contradictory views, as would be expected of any group of individuals which traverses the ideological spectrum. According to some, semi-isolationism has lacked elite champions in recent years and has proven to be a more appealing alternative to the general public than to America’s “elite” (see Kaufman, 1987). However, in the postcommunist era, the potential for renewed elite interest and diversity in selective engagement has grown.10

THE NINETIES: WATERSHED OR CONTINUITY IN POST-COLD WAR BELIEFS?

We, like Holsti and Rosenau (and Wittkopf), found considerable continuity in foreign policy views throughout the 1980s, but what about the impact of the collapse of Soviet communism for the 90s? As Norman Ornstein and Mark Schmitt (1990, p. 169) ask, “How will the U.S. political system operate without anticommunism as its central organizing principle?” The momentous events surrounding the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the

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10 Isolationist sentiment among Americans was quite strong before World War II. Nevertheless, even with the rise of the Cold War and views of internationalism, isolationism remains endemic among members of the American mass public, as Barnet (1981) convincingly points out. This is consistent with all public opinion surveys, which indicate that the mass public has consistently been more isolationist than elites (see Wittkopf, 1990).
collapse of the Soviet Union have raised the possibility that profound changes could occur in elite beliefs toward U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, a great debate over the proper role of the United States in the world has been generated throughout national journals of opinion and, even more visibly, in recent issues of foreign policy journals.\(^{11}\)

The political psychological literature on perceptions suggests two likely patterns for this renewed debate to follow (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Herrmann, 1985; Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1986; Oskamp, 1977; Rosati, 1987, 1995). First and foremost, individuals tend to avoid uncertainty and display continuity in their beliefs over time, thus resisting change. Stability of beliefs is especially the case for elites because they tend to be more attentive, informed, and cognitively complex than the mass public (see Almond, 1960; Converse, 1964; Galtung, 1965; Hughes, 1978; Neuman, 1986; Rosenau, 1961). In fact, individual commitment to political beliefs is greatest among those who have been found to be among the most active in American politics (see also Conway, 1991). However, while individual belief systems tend to be resistant to change, a second pattern involving change can still occur, especially as a result of profound changes in the environment accompanied by spectacular events (see also Deutsch & Merritt, 1965; Lebow, 1981). As Robert Jervis (1976, p. 262) has pointed out, “since events with major consequences for a nation absorb so much of the citizen’s time and attention, they both socialize the previously unconcerned and change the perceptual predispositions of many people with established views.” Clearly, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have the potential to act as catalysts for changes in the foreign policy views of Americans.

To determine the extent elite views changed or remained the same, we conducted a like content analysis of “America and the world” type articles between 1990 and 1994, focusing in particular on the foreign policy journals and paying attention to the individuals we came across during the content analysis for the 1980–1989 period (see Table VI). What we have found so far is consistent with the dominant patterns derived from the political psychological literature on perceptions. Some change in foreign policy beliefs have occurred, especially pertaining to the structure of the international system. Among conservatives and liberals, some individuals have altered their views and tremendous disagreements have been triggered over the particular goals and priorities of U.S. foreign policy. In particular, the debate over whether America should pursue a unilateral or multilateral course in the post-Cold War world has become more pronounced. Furthermore, it appears from Table VI that the distribution of foreign policy views has changed in comparing the 1990s with the 1980s. While the global reformer perspective has become the most prominent throughout the foreign policy journals, the global

\(^{11}\) In particular, the 1990 and 1991 issues of *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *The National Interest*, as well as the fall 1994 issue of *Dissent*, have presented competing perspectives on U.S. foreign policy in a post-Cold War world.
container perspective has become less prominent since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The global crusader and global transformer perspectives have become much less visible, especially in the foreign policy journals (in comparison to the national opinion journals). Finally, the selective container and selective engager perspectives have become more visible and, thus, may be in the process of becoming more popular among elites.

Yet while we have detected some change in worldviews and in their presence in the foreign policy journals, the evidence also indicates that most American elites are adapting and absorbing into their prevailing foreign policy orientations the global changes that are occurring throughout the world. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, most elites examined here have derived lessons from the events of the late 80s and early 90s, such as the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf conflict, that are consistent with the basic characteristics of the six foreign policy orientations they adhered to throughout the 1980s. In other words, the basic thrust of each of the foreign policy orientations have experienced minor revisions for the most part in their worldviews and policy recommendations as detailed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI. Presence of Foreign Policy Orientations in Foreign Policy Journals—1980s and 1990s</th>
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<td>Foreign Policy Views</td>
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<td>GCr</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy Journals (1980–1989)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Global Affairs</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>The National Interest</em></td>
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<td><em>Foreign Affairs</em></td>
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<td><em>Foreign Policy</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>World Policy Journal</em></td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Total 5</td>
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Note: Frequency distribution is in terms of number of articles.

* Global Affairs ceased publication in 1993.

GCr = Global Crusader
GCo = Global Container
SCo = Selective Container
GRe = Global Reformer
GTr = Global Transformer
SEn = Selective Engager
Perhaps the best test of continuity and change would come initially among the conservative Cold War internationalists, who were the intellectual driving force behind so much of U.S. foreign policy after World War II. With the collapse of Soviet communism—the foundation of the Cold War consensus and the glue that has held the three competing views of Cold War internationalists together—one might expect to see significant changes in conservative perspectives as they debate the future. Some changes in individual positions have occurred. Pat Buchanan (1990), for example, has moved from a global crusader to a selective engager orientation emphasizing a more traditional form of American isolationism (see also Glazer, 1990). Others have shown tendencies to begin moving from a global container orientation to the selective container school (see Hyland, 1991–1992), which probably accounts for the lesser prominence of the global container orientation and the greater visibility of selective containers.

Yet to a large degree, although emphasis and language have been altered, the integrity of the three conservative orientations we have found remains largely intact. On the whole, “global crusaders” have not looked upon the changes in the former U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe as automatic vindication of their perspective and slipped into isolationism again as might be expected. Instead, many reacted with initial skepticism, arguing that changes in the communist world are not fundamental or are calculated by the communists to lull the U.S. into a deeper sleep. Though occasional tugs toward isolationism could be seen (see Benoit, 1991), the dominant recommendation continues to be vigilance against efforts by the United Nations and other foes to undermine freedom and American sovereignty (see McManus, 1990, 1994; Jasper, 1994). “Global containers” have not abandoned the essence of their orientation either. For them, 1989 demonstrated the fruits of American containment policy. And although the security threat to the U.S. no longer emanates from Soviet communism, they believe other threats have emerged to take its place, especially threats from the Third World. Consequently, while global containers today see the world in either more unipolar or multipolar terms and make more room for promoting free trade and capitalist principles, their time-tested methods and rationale for dealing with post-Cold War challenges prevail (see Podhoretz, 1990; Bennett, 1991; Kagen, 1994). Finally, “selective containers” see the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism as additional justification for United States foreign policy to move beyond a moral

12 The winter 1989/90, spring 1990, summer 1990 and fall 1990 issues of The National Interest featured a symposium where contributors were invited to respond to the question: “If the Cold War has ended (or, for the more cautious, is now ending) and the global containment of communism is no longer an urgent task, what central purpose—if any—should inform America’s foreign policy for the rest of the century and beyond?” Contributors included Robert Bartley, Patrick Buchanan, Ted Carpenter, Carl Gershman, Nathan Glazer, Josef Joffe, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, Edward Luttwak, Stephen Solarz, Malcolm Wallop, Ben Wattenburg, Paul Weyrich, and Peregrine Worsthorne.

13 Many of the editors of American Opinion, which ceased publication in 1986, started up a new journal with a different format in the late 80s entitled The New American.
 crusade and preoccupation with anticommunism toward an emphasis on discrimi-
nating among vital American interests, concentrating more on global economic
concerns, and acting more as a “normal” country abroad (see Tucker, 1990;
Brzezinsiki, 1991). America must restrain itself from confronting aggressors
throughout the world in the name of promoting freedom now that the Soviet
counterweight has disappeared (Hendrickson, 1992). Still, the need for order,
stability, and a balance of power dictates that forms of containment should not be
abandoned when vital interests are threatened.

A similar reinforcement of beliefs has emerged on the ideological left. The
end of the Cold War reaffirmed the beliefs of those within the post-Cold War
internationalist perspective that U.S. foreign policy needs to move beyond the
Cold War. Many “global reformers” believe that recent changes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union are traceable to the patterns of decline they
identified and that future world order and justice continues to hinge on America
adopting prescient military and economic policies (see Barnet, 1991). While
some emphasize the need to restore America at home (see Mead, 1990), to
rethink U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World (see Klare, 1992; Denitch,
1991), or to promote Wilsonian internationalism abroad (see Maynes, 1990;
Smith, 1994), the common call is for a greater exercise of American multilateral
leadership to address the opportunities and constraints of the post-Cold War
contrast, derive considerably less solace from recent global changes, arguing
that America continues to expand its power base in the world and prevent the
emergence of meaningful structural change (see Chomsky, 1990; Landau,
1990; Falk, 1994; Sweezy 1994).

Within the semi-isolationists, the basic recommendation continues to be that
U.S. foreign policy should pursue strategic disengagement and independence in
world politics. Some “selective engagers” have taken a more pessimistic perspec-
tive, emphasizing domestic issues and America’s limited role in an anarchic and
conflict-ridden world (see Ravenal, 1990–1991). Others have been more optimistic
about a limited role for America in a more benign, even uplifting global environ-
ment, where U.S. foreign policy could stand for American principles without being
interventionist (see Carpenter, 1990; Layne & Schwartz, 1993). Added variations
of this orientation may follow, some significant enough to constitute future diverse
schools of thought. What is immediately noticeable is that the selective engager
orientation has become more visible than in the past—not only have some elites
changed their worldviews toward the selective engager orientation (such as Bucha-
nan, 1990, and Glazer, 1990, from a global crusader view; Glynn, 1994, from a
global container view; and Ronald Steel, 1993, from a global reformer view), but
since the 80s articles reflecting this orientation appear more frequently in more
foreign policy and national opinion journals that traverse the ideological spectrum
(see also Posen & Ross, 1996/97).
Extending the Three- and Four-Headed Eagles

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING ELITE BELIEFS

Evaluating the results of our study in light of Holsti and Rosenau's work yields five interesting and important insights into our understanding of elite foreign policy beliefs. First, although Holsti and Rosenau's three-headed eagle serves as a useful scheme for categorizing the broad foreign policy perspectives among American elites, our results indicate that there was indeed more diversity and complexity in the range and contents of views held by American leaders than these two scholars have yet been able to capture, even with their revised four-headed eagle. While American elites tended to hold foreign policy beliefs which were Cold War internationalist, post-Cold War internationalist, or semi-isolationist-oriented during the eighties, each of these three general perspectives obscured a number of orientations that were in serious competition with one another throughout the decade and thus failed to do justice to the real degree of diversity and complexity in foreign policy thought among American elites.

Second, our results reinforce Holsti and Rosenau's finding that there is a close relationship between foreign policy orientations and ideology among elites—a significant finding that deserves closer scrutiny by students of public opinion and foreign policy. Although individuals rely on cognitive schema and heuristics to make sense of the world around them as well as to take specific positions on foreign policy issues, different schemas and heuristics may be quite consistent with different ideological orientations. In other words, for certain segments of the population, the content of foreign policy beliefs may overlap in a consistent way with different ideological orientations (see J. Schneider, 1979; Schneider, 1974–1975, 1984). This suggests that in addition to a more sophisticated understanding of people's cognitive structures—which the literature indicates vary more in terms of degrees than in kind (see Conover & Feldman, 1984; Milburn, 1991; Oskamp, 1977)—there is a need for more sophisticated thinking about the complex nature of the American public, such as distinguishing between different strata (see Almond, 1960; Galtung, 1965; Key, 1961; Neuman, 1986; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Rosenau, 1961). As Holsti (1992, p. 455) has pointed out, "one of the glaring gaps in public opinion research has been the neglect of opinion leaders."

Third, this diversity and complexity of foreign policy beliefs among American elites, in turn, indicates that the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus is more severe than conventionally understood. Such a conclusion is not just important from a scholarly standpoint; it also enriches our historical understanding of the

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14 This suggests that as the United States moves beyond the Cold War, the use of labels such as Cold War internationalists and post-Cold War internationalists to describe general foreign policy perspectives maybe should be replaced by more meaningful labels such as conservative internationalists and liberal internationalists (see also Mandelbaum & Schneider, 1978; Schneider, 1983, 1987). After all, the ideological orientations of liberalism and conservatism predate the Cold War and will continue in a post-Cold War international environment.
complex politics of U.S. foreign policy since the Vietnam War. The collapse of the Cold War consensus has produced a more volatile public, more active and diverse political participants, new and varied interest groups and social movements, a more independent and critical mass media, and a reassertive Congress that together help fuel diversity and competition in foreign policy thought. The rise of an increasingly complex, pluralistic, and fragmented policy-making process helps to explain why presidential elections matter for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (for different presidents and their advisers may operate from different and often multiple foreign policy orientations), why presidents in the post-Vietnam era have had such difficulty in governing foreign policy for a prolonged period, and why they have been unable to restore a new foreign policy consensus around their foreign policy views (see Aldrich, Sullivan & Borgida, 1989; Destler, Lake & Gelb, 1984; Mann, 1990; McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990; Nincic, 1988, 1990; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Rosati, 1993; Russett, 1990). As Destler, Gelb and Lake (1984, p. 13) argue, “The making of American foreign policy has been growing far more political—or more precisely, far more partisan and ideological.” Hence, states Alexander George (1980, p. 236), “the necessity for ad hoc day-to-day building of consensus under these circumstances makes it virtually impossible for the President to conduct a long-range foreign policy in a coherent, effective manner.” Usually, this has meant that each administration since the end of Vietnam has been forced to modify its initial policies abroad, usually toward the ideological center, in response to domestic political challenges. This helps to account for why U.S. foreign policy often has appeared to lack coherence and consistency since Vietnam.

Fourth, our results indicate the importance of developing alternative methods to complement reliance on survey research in order to more fully capture and understand the diversity and complexity of the foreign policy beliefs of Americans. As Kegley (1986, p. 467) has argued, “We need to look at opinion wherever it is exhibited.” This requires that we be open to examining multiple avenues of expression and new methods of political inquiry, ones that are heavily embedded in historical and social reality. In order to really expose the complex nature of elite beliefs in U.S. foreign policy, our study makes a case for utilizing alternative methods to probe for a greater range of beliefs and to recognize finer distinctions, such as the use of content analysis of foreign policy and national opinion journals.

Finally, an examination of the foreign policy views of elites into the early 90s indicates that both continuity and change is under way. On the one hand, some individuals have modified their foreign policy views and the selective container and selective engager perspectives have become more prominent among elites in light of changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, most individuals appear to be adapting their general foreign policy orientations to the profound environmental changes occurring around them. This means that the dynamics of change and persistence in beliefs over time are quite complicated, messy, and contradictory, as one would expect from the literature on
social cognition and schema. Should these contradictory trends continue, this suggests that even greater diversity in foreign policy thinking, as opposed to the creation of a new foreign policy consensus, will traverse the domestic political environment and affect the future politics of U.S. foreign policy. This reinforces the conclusion arrived at by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, p. 1114) with regard to the future study of public opinion:

The postures that respondents used to anchor their specific policy preferences should prove to be important analytical yardsticks for future efforts to interpret and predict mass reactions to foreign policy events. It is both more powerful and more parsimonious for students of political behavior to examine these general orientations than to focus on the opinions to specific issues, which change over time.

What is clear from our research is that the battle among elites over the direction of foreign policy is not just between three or four foreign policy orientations but as many as six or more. This is what one would expect of a society of over 250 million people living in the complex and pluralistic political environment that has arisen since the Vietnam War. Although all the orientations may not compete equally, they are all significant voices in the public arena and active within the politics of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, those orientations with fewer adherents nonetheless often act as important sources of ideas, especially during times of great debate and potential change in the making of U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, as the United States approaches the complexity and challenges of the 21st century, it is possible that the current conservative-liberal debate revolving around the appropriate type of American internationalism may evolve more into an internationalist-noninternationalist debate traversing the traditional ideological spectrum. The future bears watching closely, for our research suggests that the diversity of thought that prevails today among the elite is likely to persist and grow more complex in the future politics of U.S. foreign policy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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APPENDIX A

THE CONTENT ANALYSIS ILLUSTRATED

The contents of each of the articles referred to in Appendix A were analyzed for answers to the five broad sets of questions concerning the structure of the
international system, the major actors, the major issues, lessons of history, and foreign policy recommendations. What follows is an illustration of the content analysis as it was applied to one opinion journal article: Norman Podhoretz, “The Present Danger,” Commentary 69 (March 1980), pp. 27–40. For each of the five questions addressed, relevant extracts are provided and analyzed. As will be obvious, many of the statements extracted are relevant to more than one of the five questions addressed.

1. The structure of the international system? (assessed on a unipolar to bipolar to multipolar continuum)

“I propose that we start, then, by renouncing the general idea that before Iran and Afghanistan we had moved from ‘cold war’ to ‘detente’ and that the old political struggle between ‘East’ and ‘West’ was yielding in importance to a new economic conflict between ‘North’ and ‘South.’” (p. 27)

“If these tendencies were to continue, the overall balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States would shift in favor of the Soviets.” (p. 33)

“Much of the ‘South’ was for all practical purposes on the side of the ‘East’ against the ‘West.’” (p. 36)

Analyses. Bipolar. These and other statements indicate that Podhoretz sees the world primarily in bipolar, East-West terms, with other actors subsumed within this framework and the balance of power tilting toward the U.S.S.R.

2. The major international actors? (assessed in terms of their level of power—for example, hegemonic power, great power, regional power—and whether they pose threats or opportunities for the U.S.)

“The Soviet Union is not a nation like any other. It is a revolutionary state, exactly as Hitler’s Germany was, in the sense that it wishes to create a new international order in which it would be the dominant power . . . It is a Communist state armed . . . to the teeth and dedicated to the destruction of the free institutions which are our heritage and our glory.” (p. 39)

[Afghanistan] “represented a new stage of Soviet expansionism.” (p. 35)

“The United States had lost its nerve and could now be taken on with impunity.” (p. 34)

“So...
Analyses. Soviet Union and U.S. as great powers; threatening. These statements indicate that the Soviet Union constitutes a global and growing threat to a weakened United States while other countries, including China, have little influence or relevance to the pressing issues of the day.

3. The major foreign policy issues? (assessed in terms of the type of issue—for example, security issues, economic issues—and whether they pose threats or opportunities for the U.S.)

“Nor was this developing pattern of Soviet advance and American retreat confined to conflicts involving clients or allies. More ominously it showed itself in the changing balance between the two superpowers themselves.” (p. 32)

“Soviet advances both in quality and quantity [of nuclear weapons] were combining with American ‘restraint’ . . . to wipe out that advantage” [for the US]. (p. 33)

“The ‘arms race’ we have allegedly been running has now left the United States with virtually no means other than a threat of nuclear war to protect the life-line and the life blood of our civilization.” (p. 36)

“Soon enough, the President of the United States . . . would have to choose between nuclear war or Soviet control over the oil supply of the West.” (p. 37)

“we would know by what name to call the new era into which we have entered . . . : the Finlandization of America.” (p. 27)

Analyses. Security issues. From these and other statements, Podhoretz displays a primary concern with Cold War and political-military issues like the superpower arms race, the use of force, and the balance of power between East and West. While these are areas which once may have provided America with opportunities, they now constitute dire threats to the future of the American system.

4. Lessons of history, such as World War II and Vietnam? (assessed in terms of their positive or negative implications for the U.S.)

“the period usually called the Cold War began in 1947 when the United States, after several years of acquiescence in the expansion of the Soviet empire, decided to resist further advance. . . .” (p. 27)

“to the casualties in blood of the Vietnam war was added another casualty, the loss of clarity which had marked the policy of the United States for twenty years.” (p. 31)
“Before Vietnam, American confidence in American power was very great . . . this confidence in American power was the second major casualty of the defeat in Vietnam.” (p. 31)

“that the victory of Communism [in Vietnam] would be tantamount to an expansion of Soviet power was vindicated. . . . The even more ‘discredited’ domino theory was thereby vindicated too.” (p. 32)

“the twin furies of isolationism and appeasement were unleashed by our humiliating defeat in Vietnam. . . .” (p. 38)

“as the main ‘Lesson of Vietnam’ was taken to be that we must never again intervene into the 'Third World, the great ‘Lesson of Afghanistan’ is likely to be that unless we intervene under certain circumstances, we will find ourselves at the mercy of our enemies.” (p. 38)

Analyses. Negative implications. From these and other statements, it is evident that Podhoretz sees the period just after World War II as a time of mistaken U.S. complacency in the face of Soviet expansionism, and that many of the same errors were being committed again, albeit perhaps more seriously and with more severe consequences, in the period following Vietnam.

5. Policy recommendations? (assessed in terms of their goals—for example, democracy, order, economic justice—and strategy—rollback, containment, multilateralism, strategic disengagement).

“To meet what George F. Kennan in 1947 called ‘this implacable challenge’ [Communism] will demand . . . today as it did then, that we recognize Soviet purposes for what they are.” (p. 39)

“In resisting the advance of Soviet power, then, we are fighting for freedom and against Communism, for democracy and against totalitarianism. Yet it is precisely this sense of things that the new nationalism thus far lacks.” (p. 40)

[the new nationalism] “is spiritually superior to self-flagellation . . . [and] safer because the determination to defend our own interests will make us more secure than the inclination to appease.” (p. 39)

“a steady and consistent strategy of containment.” (p. 40)

Analyses. Democracy; containment. Podhoretz believes American foreign policy should champion the values of democracy and freedom by developing a “new nationalism” at home and reviving aggressive containment policies abroad.
REFERENCES


Extending the Three- and Four-Headed Eagles


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