![]()
David Hume Kennerly / Getty Images-Pool
Tough tactics: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld pushed for a
Gitmo style approach to prisoner interrogations in Iraq
|
May 24 issue - It's not easy to get a member of Congress to stop talking. Much less a room full of them. But as a small group of legislators watched the images flash by in a small, darkened hearing room in the Rayburn Building last week, a sickened silence descended. There were 1,800 slides and several videos, and the show went on for three hours. The nightmarish images showed American soldiers at Abu Ghraib Prison forcing Iraqis to masturbate. American soldiers sexually assaulting Iraqis with chemical light sticks. American soldiers laughing over dead Iraqis whose bodies had been abused and mutilated. There was simply nothing to say. "It was a very subdued walk back to the House floor," said Rep. Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee. "People were ashen."
|
Indeed, the single most iconic image to come out of the abuse scandal—that
of a hooded man standing naked on a box, arms outspread, with wires dangling
from his fingers, toes and penis—may do a lot to undercut the
administration's case that this was the work of a few criminal MPs. That's
because the practice shown in that photo is an arcane torture method known
only to veterans of the interrogation trade. "Was that something that [an
MP] dreamed up by herself? Think again," says Darius Rejali, an expert on
the use of torture by democracies. "That's a standard torture. It's called
'the Vietnam.' But it's not common knowledge. Ordinary American soldiers did
this, but someone taught them."
Who might have taught them? Almost certainly it was their superiors up the
line. Some of the images from Abu Ghraib, like those of naked prisoners
terrified by attack dogs or humiliated before grinning female guards,
actually portray "stress and duress" techniques officially approved at the
highest levels of the government for use against terrorist suspects. It is
unlikely that President George W. Bush or senior officials ever knew of
these specific techniques, and late last week Defense spokesman Larry DiRita
said that "no responsible official of the Department of Defense approved any
program that could conceivably have been intended to result in such abuses."
But a NEWSWEEK investigation shows that, as a means of pre-empting a repeat
of 9/11, Bush, along with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General
John Ashcroft, signed off on a secret system of detention and interrogation
that opened the door to such methods. It was an approach that they adopted
to sidestep the historical safeguards of the Geneva Conventions, which
protect the rights of detainees and prisoners of war. In doing so, they
overrode the objections of Secretary of State Colin Powell and America's top
military lawyers—and they left underlings to sweat the details of what
actually happened to prisoners in these lawless places. While no one
deliberately authorized outright torture, these techniques entailed a
systematic softening up of prisoners through isolation, privations, insults,
threats and humiliation—methods that the Red Cross concluded were
"tantamount to torture."
|
|||||||||||||||||
"There was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11," as Cofer Black, the onetime director of the CIA's counterterrorist unit, put it in testimony to Congress in early 2002. "After 9/11 the gloves came off." Many Americans thrilled to the martial rhetoric at the time, and agreed that Al Qaeda could not be fought according to traditional rules. But it is only now that we are learning what, precisely, it meant to take the gloves off.
The story begins in the months after September 11, when a small band of conservative lawyers within the Bush administration staked out a forward-leaning legal position. The attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, these lawyers said, had plunged the country into a new kind of war. It was a conflict against a vast, outlaw, international enemy in which the rules of war, international treaties and even the Geneva Conventions did not apply. These positions were laid out in secret legal opinions drafted by lawyers from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and then endorsed by the Department of Defense and ultimately by White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, according to copies of the opinions and other internal legal memos obtained by NEWSWEEK.
May 24 issue - The Bush administration's emerging approach was that America's enemies in this war were "unlawful" combatants without rights. One Justice Department memo, written for the CIA late in the fall of 2001, put an extremely narrow interpretation on the international anti-torture convention, allowing the agency to use a whole range of techniques—including sleep deprivation, the use of phobias and the deployment of "stress factors"—in interrogating Qaeda suspects. The only clear prohibition was "causing severe physical or mental pain"—a subjective judgment that allowed for "a whole range of things in between," said one former administration official familiar with the opinion. On Dec. 28, 2001, the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel weighed in with another opinion, arguing that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction to review the treatment of foreign prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. The appeal of Gitmo from the start was that, in the view of administration lawyers, the base existed in a legal twilight zone—or "the legal equivalent of outer space," as one former administration lawyer described it. And on Jan. 9, 2002, John Yoo of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel coauthored a sweeping 42-page memo concluding that neither the Geneva Conventions nor any of the laws of war applied to the conflict in Afghanistan.
The White House was undeterred. By Jan. 25,
2002, according to a memo obtained by NEWSWEEK, it was clear that Bush had
already decided that the Geneva Conventions did not apply at all, either to the
Taliban or Al Qaeda. In the memo, which was written to Bush by Gonzales, the
White House legal counsel told the president that Powell had "requested that you
reconsider that decision." Gonzales then laid out startlingly broad arguments
that anticipated any objections to the conduct of U.S. soldiers or CIA
interrogators in the future. "As you have said, the war against terrorism is a
new kind of war," Gonzales wrote to Bush. "The nature of the new war places a
high premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information
from captured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities
against American civilians." Gonzales concluded in stark terms: "In my judgment,
this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of
enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions."
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Gonzales also argued that dropping Geneva would allow the president to "preserve his flexibility" in the war on terror. His reasoning? That U.S. officials might otherwise be subject to wa